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I. INTRODUCTION
As technology continually evolves, unique challenges and
opportunities are constantly presented to the music industry.* In
today’s  music  market,  the  Internet  is  creating  a  new  crossroad  for  
music distributors as well as consumers. The more readily
available music becomes, the more rapidly consumers will expect
it; and as is often the case with emerging technologies, copyright
law has not been able to keep pace with such drastic changes.1
Additionally, it appears that the economic value placed on
music has decreased in our society. While legitimate music
markets still exist, it is clear that consumers are just not willing to
pay what they used to for physical albums.2 Today’s   music  
industry is so centered on earning profits through album sales that
it is missing out on the steadily growing number of people whose
valuations for music have fundamentally shifted. While sharing
music has always been a significant social practice3—with the
* For   a   shockingly   accurate   overview   of   the   prominent   issues   in   today’s  
music market and how they should be confronted, see The State of the Music
Industry, OATMEAL, http://theoatmeal.com/comics/music_industry (last visited
Jan. 24, 2015).
1
See infra Part III.A.
2
According to a study by Billboard Magazine, overall album sales dropped
8.4% in 2013, decreasing by 26.6 million units over the course of the year. The
report   also   indicates   that   physical   CD   sales   “declined   14.5%   to   165.4   million  
units,   down   from   193.4   million   in   the   prior   year.”   Physical album sales still
comprise  57.2%  of  music  sales  in  the  U.S.;;  however,  digital  sales  account  for  40.6%  of  
album  revenue.  Ed  Christman,  Digital  Music  Sales  Decrease  for  First  Time  in  2013,  
BILLBOARDBIZ   (Jan.  3,   2014),   http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-andmobile/5855162/digital-music-sales-decrease-for-first-time-in-2013.
3
When discussing music piracy, many consumers automatically jump to
consideration of online file sharing and downloading. However, according to the
Recording  Industry  Association  of  America,  “[r]egardless  of  the  format  at  issue,  
the same basic principle applies: music sound recordings may not be copied or
distributed  without  the  permission  of  the  owner.”  This  includes  not  only  Internet  
copying, but also burning and distributing physical CDs. The Law, RIAA,
http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=piracy_online_the_la
w (last visited Nov. 11, 2014). For a more comprehensive discussion of how CD
burning contributed to loss in revenue in the music industry before widespread

[6:193 2015]

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW REVIEW

196

increase of illegal downloading sites, and the growing ease of
sharing music with friends4 through digital media connections—
the importance of creating a marketplace that is mutually
beneficial to publishers and consumers is increasingly important.5
In short, the current music market is in dire need of an effective
response to online music piracy.
While the negative effect of online music piracy cannot be
overstated, fair compensation issues do not cease with societal
habits   of   illegal   downloading.   When   evaluating   today’s   online  
music market, it is clear that the business model that topdistribution services are utilizing is also failing artists.6 In February
2014, members of Congress and advocates of increasing artist
compensation joined forces to create the Songwriter Equity Act of
2014 (SEA). Proposed changes would alter both sections 114(i)
and 115 of the Copyright Act, which proponents of the bill believe
prevent songwriters from receiving royalty rates that reflect a fair
online file-sharing, see Gwendolyn Mariano, Music Industry Sounds Off on CD
Burning, CNET NEWS (June 11, 2002), http://news.cnet.com/Music-industrysounds-off-on-CD-burning/2100-1023_3-935120.html. Additionally, for a brief
overview of unauthorized copying of music pre-Internet piracy, see Danwill
David Schwender, Reducing Unauthorized Digital Downloading of Music by
Obtaining Voluntary Compliance with Copyright Law Through the Removal of
Corporate Power in the Recording Industry, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 225, 23538 (2012).
4
Not only has online music piracy become a more accessible option for
consumers,   industry   experts   also   suggest   that   today’s   society   is   failing   to  
recognize music as intellectual property. Danwill David Schwender provides a
helpful  example  in   stating,   “a  person   who  purchases   music  on  a  compact  disc,  
listens to it, and then gives the album to a friend can no longer listen to that
compact disc until it is returned or repurchased. But a person sharing a digital
music file over a peer-to-peer network does not sacrifice the original digital
music  file.”  Schwender,  supra note 3, at 244.
5
Successful   songwriter   Rivers   Rutherford   stated   that   “[t]he   irony   of   the  
digital  age  is  it’s  getting  harder  and  harder  to  make  a  living as a songwriter, even
though our music is being heard by more people in more places than ever
before.”  Andrew  Watt,  Songwriter Equity Act, GIBSONS NEWS (May 30, 2014),
http://www.gibsonssolicitors.com.au/news/songwriter-equity-act/.
6
See infra Part VI.C.i.a.
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market value for the use of their intellectual property.7 There is
very little industry debate over the necessity of section 114(i)
reform, which currently limits federal rate courts from considering
royalty rates as a relevant standard for regulating performance
royalty rates for songwriters and composers.8 However, the
proposed increase to the mechanical royalty rate under section 115
is significantly more problematic and would likely cause a
detrimental spike in costs across the music industry. 9 While SEA is
admirable in its mission to grant artists more financial return for
their work, it would add considerably to music production costs—
including transaction costs, which music pirates are already
avoiding.
A more efficient approach to battle artist compensation issues
in the music industry would be to convert to a model emulating
television’s recent switch to online streaming distribution.10 At a
nominal fee, consumers may be more willing to compromise
between paying for full, physical albums and illegally obtaining
music.11 While the current online music distribution market is on
the right track, there is still significant work to be done in
advancing   the   industry’s   business   practices   to   provide   adequate  
payment for the artist whose work is currently being accessed by
millions of consumers at little or no cost.12

7

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part II.C.
9
See infra Part V.A.
10
See generally, Scott Hervey, The Future of Online Music: Labels and
Artists, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 279, 284 (2002).
11
A report by CNN suggests that younger generations are more apt to
stream music rather than own it outright. According to Paul Resnikoff, publisher
and editor-in-chief  of  Digital  Music  News,  “[w]e are already seeing a trend on
the  aggregate  with  the  lack  of  music  ownership.”  Jareen  Imam,  Young Listeners
Opting to Stream, Not Own Music, CNN TECH (June 16, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/tech/web/music-streaming/.
12
See infra Part VI.C.i.b.
8
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II. WHAT OWNERSHIP RIGHTS ARE SONGWRITERS
GUARANTEED UNDER CURRENT COPYRIGHT
LAW?
A. Mechanical Licenses
Copyright protection has been a matter of relentless
controversy throughout
modern
history.
Technological
advancements have also greatly affected copyright protection and
fair compensation for artists. Debates concerning copyright
protection in an evolving musical industry first arose in 1908,
when composers began to lobby Congress for a legislative change
granting them exclusive rights to authorize the mechanical
reproductions of their works in response to White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.13 At this time, the player piano was
popular in the United States, and copyright owners had concerns
about their right to control the reproduction of their works on piano
rolls. The technology used to broadcast audio transmissions was
also not widely available at the time the 1909 Copyright Act was
debated. Congress did not extend copyright protection to sound
recordings on records even though this medium was becoming
more widespread because the average consumer did not have the
ability to copy records.14

13
209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). In White v. Apollo, the Supreme Court ruled that
manufacturers of music rolls for player pianos did not have to pay royalties to
the composers. The Court stated that piano rolls were parts of the machine that
reproduced the music, rather than copies of the   plaintiffs’   copyrighted   sheet  
music. Id. The  case  likely  caused  Congress’s  intervention  to  create  a  compulsory  
license  for  the  manufacture  and  distribution  of  such  “mechanical”  embodiments  
of musical works through an amendment to the Copyright Act of 1909. See
EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT, 33–38 (2000),
available at http://www.edwardsamuels.com/illustratedstory/isc2.htm.
14
Even forty years later, it was more efficient to record a live performance
onto vinyl than to copy a record. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2195
(2000).

[6:193 2015]

How Spotify Killed the Radio Star

199

In addition to technological limitations to potential
infringement, it is also possible that Congress did not consider
sound   recordings   to   be   “writings”   as   provided   for   in   the  
Constitution at the time of drafting. Congress was mainly
concerned with providing protection for musical compositions on a
written  page,  “securing  to  the  composer  an  adequate  return  for  all
use made of his composition and at the same time prevent[ing] the
formation   of   oppressive   monopolies.”15 Accordingly, copyright
protection did not extend to recordings of a composition onto a
physical medium but only the written composition itself.
Therefore, when the United States Supreme Court held that piano
rolls  were  not  “copies”  of  the  composers’  works, but physical parts
of the piano itself, Congress was forced to tailor the Copyright Act
of 1909 to include a compulsory license for the manufacture and
distribution  of  such  “mechanical”  embodiments  of  musical  works.
Under modern copyright law, section 115 of the 1976 Copyright
Act16 grants songwriters the right, with certain restrictions,17 to

15

See, e.g., Proposed Conclusions of Law, Jointly Submitted by Sirius
Satellite Radio, Inc. and XM Satellite Radio Inc. at 10, n.2, Adjustment of Rates
& Terms For Preexisting Subscription Servs & Satellite Digital Audio Radio
Servs, No. 2006-1 CRB DSTRA (October 1, 2007), available at
http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2006-1/pff-cl/10-1-07-sdars-joint-proposedconclusions-of-law.pdf.
16
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2556 (1976).
17
17   U.S.C.   §   115(a)(1)   (2012)   (“A   person   may   obtain   a   compulsory  
license only if his or her primary purpose in making phonorecords is to
distribute them to the public for private use, including by means of a digital
phonorecord delivery. A person may not obtain a compulsory license for use of
the work in the making of phonorecords duplicating a sound recording fixed by
another, unless: (i) such sound recording was fixed lawfully; and (ii) the making
of the phonorecords was authorized by the owner of copyright in the sound
recording or, if the sound recording was fixed before February 15, 1972, by any
person who fixed the sound recording pursuant to an express license from the
owner of the copyright in the musical work or pursuant to a valid compulsory
license  for  use  of  such  work  in  a  sound  recording.”).
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make   and   distribute   “mechanical   reproductions”18 of their
compositions.19
B. Compulsory Licenses
In addition to the creation of mechanical licenses, Section 115
of the Copyright Act established a compulsory license for the
reproduction and distribution of nondramatic musical works.20
Under the compulsory licensing system, a songwriter has the
exclusive right to make the first mechanical reproduction of his or
her work.21 Once the original copy of the composition has been
published, however, the copyright owner is compelled to license
his or her work to any party who meets the requirements of the
license.22 This right is primarily associated with performers

18
Originally,   reproductions   were   referred   to   as   “mechanical”   because the
composition   was   being   “mechanically”   recorded   on   media   such   as   a  
phonography   record   or   piano   roll.   Today,   “mechanical   reproductions”   are  
referred   to   as   “phonorecords”   and   come   in   formats   such   as   compact   discs,  
cassette tapes, records, and even digital phonorecords such as MP3s. See Section
115 Compulsory License: The Register of Copyrights Before the Subcommittee
on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights,  Copyright  Office),  available  at  http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031104.html.
19
17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).
20
17   U.S.C.   §   115(a)(1)   (2012)   (“When   phonorecords of a nondramatic
musical work have been distributed to the public in the United States under the
authority of the copyright owner, any other person, including those who make
phonorecords or digital phonorecord deliveries, may, by complying with the
provisions of this section, obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute
phonorecords  of  the  work.”).
21
Id.; see Mary Jane Frisby, Rockin’  Down  the  Highway:  Forging  a  Path  
for the Lawful Use of MP3 Digital Music Files, 33 IND. L. REV. 317, 325 (1999).
22
Generally, these requirements include royalty payment to the copyright
owner at a set statutory rate, adequate notice of a request to use the compulsory
license, and adequate reporting of the provisions from the license. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 115(b)(1)—(c) (2012).
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recording  “covers”  of  songs  composed  and  originally  performed  by  
another artist.23
Songwriters have the exclusive right to publicly perform their
own compositions.24 “Traditionally,   this   right   was   primarily  
implicated   by   broadcast   analog   radio   and   television   .   .   .   .”25
However,   in   today’s   ever-evolving tech-savvy society, digital
broadcasters, webcasting, satellite radio, and some online music
services frequently implicate this right.26 In order to better
“administer  these  rights  on  behalf  of  songwriters,”  entities  known  
as Performance Rights Organizations (PROs) were established.27
Currently there are three operating PROs: the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP),28 Broadcast Music,

23

This right does not extend to artists who merely publish works similar in
nature or content to the original copyrighted work. See, e.g., Peters v. West, 692
F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2012).
24
As held in Hulex Music v. Santy,   “[i]n   order   to   show   copyright
infringement, a plaintiff must establish five elements: (1) the originality and
authorship of the works involved, (2) compliance with the formalities of federal
copyright law, (3) rightful proprietorship of the copyrights as issue, (4) that the
copyrighted works were performed publicly for profit, and (5) a lack of
authorization   by   the   owner   of   the   owner’s   representative   for   the   alleged  
infringer   to   publicly   perform   the   works.”   698   F.   Supp.   1024,   1030   (D.N.H.  
1988).
For a more current example illustrating   songwriters’   exclusive   right   to  
publicly perform their own compositions, see Severe Records, LLC. v. Rich,
658 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2011).
25
Skyla Mitchell, Reforming Section 115: Escape from the Byzantine World
of Mechanical Licensing, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1239, 1252 (2007).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. In 2013, ASCAP collected over $945 million in licensing fees and
distributed $851 million in royalties to its members. While ASCAP is a not-forprofit organization, it ran with a 12.1% operating expense ratio in 2013. THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, 2013 ANNUAL
REPORT 17 (2013). As of July 2013, ASCAP membership included over 500,000
songwriters, composers, and music publishers. THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, http://www.ascap.com/about (last
visited Nov. 14, 2014).
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Inc. (BMI),29 and the Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers (SESAC).30 Combined, ASCAP and BMI represent
roughly 97% of all American compositions.31 All three PROs offer
radio stations the use of a blanket license, which is a set fee that
allows each station the use of any composition represented by the
PRO.32 After deducting overhead costs, the profits made from each
blanket license agreement are then distributed as royalty payments
to all represented songwriters.33
In 2004, The Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act34
created a board of Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs, or sometimes

29

In fiscal year 2013, BMI collected over $944 million in licensing fees and
distributed $814 million in royalties. BROADCAST MUSIC INC.,
http://www.bmi.com/press/entry/563077 (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). BMI
tracks public performances for 8.5 million works, and collects and distributes
licensing revenues for those performances as royalties to the over 650,000
composers, songwriters, and music publishers it represents. BROADCAST MUSIC
INC., www.bmi.com/about (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
30
SESAC is the smallest of the three PROs in the United States,
representing just over 9,000 authors and composers. However, SESAC is also
the fastest-growing PRO in the United States. Unlike ASCAP and BMI (both
not-for-profit organizations), SESAC retains some income as profit.
Additionally, unlike the other prominent PROs, SESAC does not offer open
membership. In order to benefit from the organization, members must be
approved to join. SESAC, www.sesac.com/About (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
31
Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1252 (citing Michael A. Einhorn, Intellectual
Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in Broadcasting, 24 COLUM.
J.L.  &  ARTS,  349,  349  (2001),  available  at  http://  www.musicdish.com/mag/index.php3?id=3823).
32
Id. For a more detailed explanation of how blanket license agreements are
executed, see Neil Conley, The Future of Licensing Music Online: The Role of
Collective Rights Organization and the Effect of Territoriality, 25 J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 409, 422–23 (2008).
33
Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1253. Generally, there is a 50/50 distribution
of royalty payments between writers and publishers. Conley, supra note 32, at
423.
34
Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-419, 118 Stat. 2341 (enacted through 17 U.S.C. §114(f) (2006)), available
at http://copyright.gov/title17/92appc.pdf. See also, Peter Dicola & Matthew
Sag, An Information- Gathering Approach to Copyright Policy, 34 CARDOZO L.
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referred to simply as the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB))
responsible for determining the rates and terms for statutory
licenses.35 Under the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform
Act,  “statutory  rates”  are  set  through  either  voluntary  negotiations  
or trial-type hearings before the panel of three CRJs.36 When
calculating royalty rates, CRJs are expected to focus on four main
objectives.37 In order to maintain an equal balance between artists
and distribution companies, royalty rates must be set to maximize
availability of song uses; afford a fair return to the copyright owner
and a fair income to the song user that reflects the roles of each;
and minimize the disruptive impact on the structure of the
industries involved.38
While the CRB is aware of copyright holder and user needs
when setting the statutory royalty rate, due to burdensome monthly
payment provisions of Section 115 and competition among
composers, the statutory terms are rarely followed.39 The statutory
mechanical rate merely represents a ceiling40 for voluntary
REV. 173, 231–33 (2012) (discussing the Copyright Royalty and Distribution
Reform Act of 2004 and its impact on the current music industry).
35
Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1250.
36
17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(C) (2010); 17 U.S.C. § 803 (2010).
37
Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1250 n.69 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1));
Recording  Indus.   Ass’n  of   Am.  v.  Copyright   Royalty  Tribunal,  662  F.2d  1,  13  
(1981).
38
Recording  Indus.  Ass’n  of  Am.  v.  Copyright  Royalty  Tribunal,  662  F.2d  
1, 13 (1981).
39
See Howard B. Abrams, Copyright’s   First   Compulsory   License, 26
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 234–39 (2010).
40
There are many advocates pushing for an alteration of the mechanical
royalty rate system, in that a minimum rate would be established, replacing the
current maximum rate (i.e., a floor rather than a ceiling). Mitchell, supra note
25, at 1243.While this is not an entirely deficient idea, it does have some flaws.
Due to unevenness in bargaining power, artists do frequently agree upon a
mechanical rate significantly lower than the statutory rate. Mitchell, supra note
25, at 1249; Abrams, supra note 39, at 235. Record companies have the power
to force artists to settle at a low rate, and should a minimum royalty rate be the
new industry standard, it is likely that most record companies would still be able
to negotiate agreements at the lowest legal limit. Id. at 235.

[6:193 2015]

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW REVIEW

204

negotiations between a music publisher,   the   composition’s  
copyright holder, and the licensee.41
C. Section 114 Limitations
Not only are composers burdened by the potential for lessthan-desirable royalty payments under Section 115, they are also
subject to further rate limitations under section 114 of the
Copyright Act. In cases where the royalty rate is reached through
negotiation, interested parties discuss rates and terms with
SoundExchange,42 and present those to the CJRs for adoption. If
the judges adopt the agreement, it will be available for opt-in by
any similarly situated parties. Any parties who have not negotiated
agreements through SoundExchange may present their agreement
to the CRJs, who will conduct a rate setting arbitration to establish
41

Most record contracts pay mechanical royalties at approximately threefourths of the statutory rate. Hervey, supra note 10, at 289. Additionally,
through controlled compositions clauses, artists are frequently limited in the
number of tracks on which mechanical royalties will be paid (typically ten out of
the average twelve songs on an album). Id. This will result in an additional loss
in profits to the artist. For more information on controlled composition clauses
in contractual agreements in the music industry, see Hervey, supra note 10, at
289.
42
Prior to 1995, (under 17 U.S.C. 114(g)(2)(A)), recording companies and
their artists were not entitled to receive payment for the public performance of
their sound recordings. However, as a result of The Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Act of 1995 and The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998, a performance right for sound recordings was granted. Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (1995); The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). Accordingly, under current copyright law it is
now required that users of music pay the copyright owner of the sound recording
for the public performance of that music. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012). This notably
includes any online music transmissions of the recording. SoundExchange is a
not-for-profit organization that collects royalties on behalf of sound recording
copyright owners and features artists for non-interactive digital transmissions,
including satellite and Internet radio. For more information about the licenses
granted by SoundExchange and its royalty distribution process, see
SOUNDEXCHANGE GENERAL FAQ, www.soundexchange.com/generalfaq (last
visited Sep. 6, 2014).
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royalty rates. However, under Section 114(i) of the Copyright
Act,43 federal rate courts are forbidden from considering sound
recording royalty rates when determining what performance
royalty rates should be for songwriters and composers. Not only
does Section 114(i) prevent the rate courts from using mechanical
royalties as a standard for performance royalties, this section also
precludes PROs from presenting this as an argument in a court of
law.44 As   a   result,   “digital   streaming   services   often   pay   an   unfair  
royalty rate to the artists that they feature.”45
III. INDUSTRY LIMITATIONS ON MUSICAL
COPYRIGHT TODAY
A. Emerging Technology as a Constant Threat to Copyright
Protections
Rapidly emerging avenues of technology are readily rendering
Section 115 more ineffective against copyright challenges. The
decentralized nature of the Internet poses a significant difficulty in
tracking and policing online copyright infringement, especially
since most illegal music distribution takes place through peer-topeer file sharing.46 No central authority exists to help control the
43

17   U.S.C.   §   114(i)   (2012).   (“License   fees   payable   for   the   public  
performance of sound recordings under section 106(6) shall not be taken into
account in any administrative, judicial, or other governmental proceeding to set
or adjust the royalties payable to copyright owners of musical works for the
public performance of their works. It is the intent of Congress that royalties
payable to copyright owners of musical works for the public performance of
their works shall not be diminished in any respect as a result of the rights
granted  by  section  106(6).”).
44
Kyle Duncan, The Songwriter Equity Act, AMPED BLOG (June 24, 2014),
http://theampedblog.com/2014/06/songwriter-equity-act/.
45
Id.
46
Most piracy activity occurs through peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing. P2P
file sharing occurs when digital media is distributed using a software program
that searches for other connected users wishing to trade electronic books, music,
movies, or games. Since P2P file sharing transactions occur between individual
users, it is difficult to track every illegal interaction, especially considering the
widespread nature of the practice. John C. Boehm, Copyright Reform for the
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relentlessly expanding scope of online behavior.47 This, coupled
with the seemingly virtual anonymity of the Internet, contributes to
the constant infringement of copyrights, in particular music
sharing.48
Napster was the predominant pioneer among peer-to-peer filesharing software.49 However, on December 6, 1999, several record
companies filed an action against Napster for vicarious and
contributory copyright infringement.50 After proving that
individual users of Napster were the primary infringers of
copyright law, the Ninth Circuit held that Napster users, by
illegally uploading and downloading music files, were in violation
of   copyright   holders’   exclusive   rights   of   reproduction   and  
distribution.51 While the court did not entirely shut down Napster,
the court did place several heavy constraints on the system.52 After
Digital Era: Protecting the Future of Recorded Music Through Compulsory
Licensing and Proper Judicial Analysis, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 169 at
179 (2009); see also Hisanari Harry Tanaka, Post-Napster: Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing Systems Current and Future Issues on Secondary Liability Under
Copyright Laws in the United States and Japan, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37 at
40–42 (2001).
47
While deterrence against pirating music online through increased
penalties to individuals has been visited, such drastic measures are unlikely to be
adopted. Boehm, supra note 46, at 207–08.
48
Id. at 198.
49
Napster’s  MusicShare  software,  which  was  available  as  a  free  download  
from  Napster’s   website,  allowed  users  to  search  for  and  trade  MP3  music  files  
among anyone else using the software. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
50
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 898, 900 (N.D. Cal.
2000) ,aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd, 284
F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
51
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. The court found that Napster had contributory
liability, because it knew, or had reason to know, of direct copyright
infringement by its users. Id. at 1020–24. Additionally, the court held that the
site had a right to supervise and direct financial interest in the activities of its
users. Id.
52
Id. at 1028. Napster was required to remove any user file from the
system’s  music  index  if  Napster  had  reasonable  knowledge  the  file  contained  a  
plaintiffs’   copyrighted works. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No., 2001
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three months of monitoring by the district court, it determined that
Napster was not in satisfactory compliance with the requirements
of the enforced injunction. After the unsuccessful trial period, the
court ordered Napster to close.53
While Napster is no longer in existence, there is a continued
abundance of illegal online peer-to-peer file-sharing hosts.
Lawsuits similar to the one brought against Napster are fairly
common; however, with the ever-evolving nature of technology, it
is difficult to keep up with every new avenue of illegal online
distribution.54 Due to the vast availability of unauthorized copies of
digital phonorecords, consumers are now able to download nearly
any sound recording they wish, usually free of charge. While there
is a successful legitimate online market55 for downloaded music, it
fails to keep up with the never-ending number of sites providing
free downloads.56
WL 227083, at 1 (N.D. Cal. 2001) aff'd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002). In turn,
the plaintiffs were ordered to give Napster notice of specific files they knew to
be infringed upon. Id.
53
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
54
For further examples of post-Napster litigation surrounding illegal online
music distribution, see MGM Studios, Incorporated v. Grokster, Limited, 259 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1031-33 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that when a party distributes
a device that can be used to infringe copyright, it is liable for the resulting acts
of infringement by third parties) and In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334
F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
55
iTunes, a media player, library, and mobile device application developed
by Apple Inc., legally generated over $12 billion in downloaded music profits in
2013 alone. Owen Thomas, iTunes is a Bigger Business Now than Apple was in
2004,  BUS..  INSIDER  (JAN.  9,  2013,  10:33  PM),  http://www.businessinsider.com/itunes-sales-2013-1;
see also APPLE INFO, www.apple.com/about (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) (describing current
company news and profit information).
56
According to Billboard Biz (the online music business extension of
Billboard Magazine), in 2013, digital track sales fell 5.7% from 1.34 billion
units  to  1.26  billion  units.  This  was  the  first  time  in  iTunes’  thirteen-year history
that the store finished the year with a decrease in digital music sales. Ed
Christman, Digital Music Sales Decrease for First Time in 2013, BILLBOARD MAG. (Jan. 3,
2014, 9:21 AM EST), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-andmobile/5855162/digital-music-sales-decrease-for-first-time-in-2013.
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For those seeking legitimate copyright usage of a particular
work, frustration and uncertainty are often experienced due to
complicated notice and reporting procedures, which frequently
lead to prohibitive transactional costs and delays. In addition to a
general lack of clarity regarding which activities require which
licenses, Section 115 has hindered online music providers in their
attempts to effectively combat piracy.57 Since businesses that wish
to take advantage of a compulsory license must engage in a costly
search58 for   the   song’s   copyright   owner, Section 115 notice
provisions are burdensome on potential licensees. Should a
business fail to locate the correct copyright holder, it must file an
intent-to-use claim with the Copyright Office for a twelve-dollar
fee.59 In accumulating initial search and Copyright Office
administrative fees, use of a compulsory license can be
57

See Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1257.
17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(1) (2006). In order to independently search for a
copyright  owner,  a  party  must  manually  check  the  Copyright  Office’s  records,  a  
task that can only be performed by traveling to the Copyright Office in
Washington D.C. Should the party wish to avoid the necessary trip to
Washington, the Copyright Office will undertake the burden of the record
search. However, while estimates vary, the expense of a search is typically $200
per hour, with a two-hour minimum. While some parties, particularly large
distribution corporations, are financially able to pay these exorbitant fees, not all
copyright owners file ownership rights with the Copyright Office. Therefore,
after the time and expense allotted for the search, the party may still be unclear
as to whom royalty payments are owed. In considering these substantial costs,
which are all incurred in pursuit of a nine-cent license, it is obvious why
potential licensees would be deterred from seeking a license under section 115,
let alone a massive collection of them needed to create appealing options for
consumers. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 4: COPYRIGHT OFFICE FEES
(2014) (discussing fees associated with Copyright Office), available at
http://copyright.gov/circs/circ04.pdf.
59
Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords,
Including Digital Phonorecord Deliveries, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,566 (March 11,
2004). A party may not take advantage of this option if she has not already
executed the manual copyright search. While it may seem a twelve-dollar fee
alone is not particularly significant, when multiplied by the thousands of songs
that an online provider may wish to make available, it is clear how quickly the
cost could become prohibitive.
58
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exorbitantly expensive and time consuming. Additionally, Section
115’s   reporting   requirements   that   require   a   licensee   to   submit  
monthly and audited annual statements of accounts to the
copyright owner are extensive and complex.60
B. Unequal Bargaining Positions Between Songwriters and Music
Publishers
Not only are composers faced with the harsh reality of
expanding online music piracy, they are also continually forced to
confront severe disparity in publishing negotiations. While changes
in technology have caused major changes in music distribution,
many artists still seek a traditional relationship with a publishing
company.61 In all relationships formed between a songwriter and
music publisher, the songwriter provides the creative product and
the music publisher holds the capital and managerial ability.62
Since most songwriters (essentially all songwriters at the beginning
of their careers) do not have the financial resources to self-publish
their compositions,63 it is practically required that the songwriters
60

37 C.F.R. § 201.19 (2006).
In   today’s   online   society, where it can feel as if fame is one MySpace
posting   away,   it   may   seem   that   a   music   publisher’s   role   has   diminished.  
However, Budi Voogt, author of The Soundcloud Bible and founder and
president of Heroic Recordings, comments on the continued importance of this
role  in  the  digital  age,  “They  [the  publishers]  will  register  your  works  with  the  
right associations, administer your royalty income and most importantly, create
commercial  opportunities.  .  .  .  Of  course,  you  can  decide  not  to  do  this  and  manage  
your  repertoire  independently.  Beware  that  this  is  a  very  time  consuming  and  diligent  
task,   as   the   publishing   landscape   is   intricate   and   highly   technical.”   Paul   Resnikoff,  
Now  You  Know  Everything  About  Music  Publishing...,  DIGITAL  MUSIC  NEWS  (Feb.  28,  
2014)  http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2014/02/28/understandpublishing.
62
See Don E. Tomlinson, Everything that Glitters is Not Gold: SongwriterMusic Publisher Agreements and Disagreements, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 85, 93–101 (1995).
63
Many modern music fans are beginning to believe successfully creating
and marketing an album is as easy as setting up a webcast or starting an online
fan page to sell albums. However, even the most simplistic of albums require a
great deal of financial support to stand a chance at profitable success. Recording
spaces  and  quality  equipment  are  essential  to  an  album’s  success,  and  it is not
61
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seek the assistance of a music publisher. This somewhat forced
relationship automatically places professional songwriters at an
extreme bargaining disadvantage.64 Historically, in contracts
between songwriters and music publishers, very few terms are
negotiable.65 Courts have little issue identifying the problems
associated with unequal bargaining positions in the formation of a
contract between songwriters and music publishers;66 however,
uncommon for different parts of each record to require separate recordings of
each element laid into each musical track. Once all the elements for each track
are recorded, a sound mixing process must occur. Professional mixers estimate
this process can take roughly six to eight hours per song, which, should an artist
choose to splurge on this process, would add significant time and cost.
So realistically, what could be the cost of producing an album? According
to John Feldmann, who has served as executive producer for bands such as
Panic!   At   the   Disco,   The   Used,   and   Good   Charlotte,   “I   think   to   record   a fulllength album, [the budget is] anywhere between $40,000 and $150,000. But for
me  to  do  a  record  for  $50,000,  I’ve got  to  be  pretty  passionate  about  the  music.”  
While  being  less  sure  of  an  album’s  going  rate,  Producer  Mark  Trombino,  who  
has worked with bands such as Blink-182 and Jimmy Eat World, agrees album
production  is  no  small  undertaking.  “The  cost  of  recording  these  days  can  vary  
so  wildly  that  I  have  no  idea  what  the  average  is,”  he  says.  “I  know  some  major  
labels are still spending a couple hundred thousand dollars on albums, while
most indies are spending $30,000. My budgets are typically somewhere in
between.”   While   there   will   always   be   individuals   creating   albums   in   their  
basements,   it’s   doubtful   the   quality   will   ever   reach   a   professional   level.   In   an  
already competitive market, a sub-par product is unlikely to yield great profits.
Emily  Zemler,  On  the  Record:  The  True  Cost  of  Recording,  THE  ALTERNATIVE  PRESS  (Feb.  28,  
2011)  http://www.altpress.com/features/entry/on_the_record_the_true_cost_of_recording.
64
Schwender, supra note 3, at 232.   (“Theoretically,   copyright   law   in   the  
United States strikes a balance between artists and consumers—granting limited,
exclusive, private rights to induce creators to produce original works in return
for a vast public domain of works. The balance, however, actually weights
heavily  in  favor  of  publishers,  especially  in  the  music  recording  industry.”).  
65
Hal I. Gilenson, Badlands: Artist-Personal Manager Conflicts of Interest
in the Music Industry, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 535 (1991).
66
See Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mill Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844, 859
(S.D.N.Y.   1982),   (“Because   of   the   impossibility   of   predicting   the   commercial  
value of a work upon its creation and because of the weak bargaining position of
[songwriters], they are sometimes assigned their copyrights in return for very
little remuneration, such as small lump-sum payments or inadequate royalty
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before showing a party in the weaker position any contractual
leniency, courts insist that the party prove substantive
unconscionability or unfairness in the terms of the contract itself.67
While some artists seek the assistance of a publisher mainly for
promotional purposes,68 when it comes to collecting royalty
profits, composers are getting a raw deal. 69 This is especially
rates, and were thus prevented from sharing fairly, if at all, in the rewards from
works that later became commercial successes.”).  
67
Unlike procedural unconscionability, which relates to unfair business
procedure in relation to the transaction, substantive unconscionability requires
unfairness of the contract itself. In Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884, 893
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 737 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1984), Ingrid Croce, widow of a
singer-songwriter Jim Croce, argued that the relationship between her husband
and his music publisher at the beginning of his career was unconscionable. The
court concluded that the contracts formed between the two parties could not be
rescinded   on   the   basis   of   unconscionability:   “[T]he   contracts   were   hard  
bargains, signed by an artist without bargaining power, and favored the
publishers, but as a matter of fact did not contain terms which shock the
conscious or differed so grossly from industry norms as to be unconscionable by
their terms. . . . Because of the uncertainty involved in the music business and
the high risk of failure of new performers, the contracts, though favoring the
defendants, were not  unfair.”  Id. at 893.
While the holding of this case is clear, should we really conform
songwriter-music publisher contracts to an industry standard that may be unfair
to  creative  professionals?  In  creating  a  system  where  one  “side”  of  the  industry  
has an extreme bargaining advantage over the other, it appears courts
determining the validity of these contracts are entirely ignoring the issue of
unconscionability. For further information concerning contracting unfairness in
the music industry, see Gilenson, supra note 65, at 515–19.
68
Douglas Wolk, music industry author and critic, states that only 6% of
performers  actually  make  money  from  recording  revenues.  “Recordings  are  how  
listeners generally spend the most time experiencing music, but not how we
spend the most money experiencing music. In practice, recordings mostly serve
as  promotion  for  the  other  ways  musicians  make  money:  performing,  most  of  all,  but  also  salaries  
for   playing   in   orchestras   and   other   groups,   session   work,   and   so   on.”   Douglas   Wolk,   How  
Ashamed  Should  You  Feel  About   Using  Spotify?,   SLATE   GROUP  (Aug.  21,  2013,  6:30  AM)  
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2013/08/spotify_and_pandora_artist_payment
s_not_as_exploitative_as_they_re_made.html.
69
Many artists are now turning to social media to speak out against the
despairingly low royalty payments they are afforded, particularly by newer
online streaming sites. See infra Part VI.C.i.a. See also Paul Resnikoff, 16
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relevant when considering the exceptionally low royalty payments
provided for artists through up-and-coming online streaming
sites.70
IV. PROPOSED REFORMATION EFFORTS OF THE
SONGWRITER EQUITY ACT
A. Changes Proposed by the Songwriter Equity Act
The Songwriter Equity Act (SEA) intends to revise both
Section 115 and Section 114 of the Copyright Act. Advocates of
SEA suggest that alterations would allow songwriters to receive
better performance and mechanical royalty rates.71 Since
Representative Doug Collins72 introduced SEA on February 25,
2014,  it  has  gained  “sixteen  co-sponsors in the House and has been
referred to the subcommittee on courts, intellectual property, and
the   Internet.”73 Following   SEA’s   first   introduction   in   the   U.S.  
House of Representatives, the bill also gained momentum with

Artists That Are Now Speaking Out Against Streaming..., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS
(Dec.
2,
2013)
http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2013/12/02/artistspiracy.
70
See infra Part VI.C.i.a.
71
See Press Kit, Rep. Doug Collins, Paul Williams, David Israelite, Michael
O’Neill   &   Daryl   Friedman,   Songwriter   Equity   Act   Press   Kit   (Feb.   25,   2014),  
http://www.bmi.com/images/news/2014/SEA_press_kit.pdf   [hereinafter   Songwriter  
Equity  Act  Press  Kit];;  see  also  Duncan,  supra  note  44.
72
Doug  Collins  serves  as  a  Republican  Congressman  for  the  9th  District  of  Georgia.  
Biography,  CONGRESSMAN  DOUG  COLLINS,  http://dougcollins.house.gov/biography  (last  
visited  Nov.  15,  2014).
73
Ed  Christman,  Songwriter  Equity  Act  Picks  Up  Momentum  in  Senate,  Aims  to  
Modernize   Copyright   Law,   BILLBOARD   (May   12,   2014,   8:39   PM),  
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/publishing/6084822/songwriter-equity-actsenate-copyright-law;;   see   Collins   Introduces   Songwriter   Equity   Act,   CONGRESSMAN  
DOUG   COLLINS   (Feb.   25,   2014),   http://dougcollins.house.gov/press-releases/collinsintroduces-songwriter-equity-act/;;  see  also  Nate  Rau,  Ga.  Congressman  Doug  Collins  
Vows   to   Fight   for   Songwriters,   TENNESSEAN   (Mar.   19,   2014,   6:14   PM),  
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2014/03/19/ga-congressman-dougcollins-vows-to-fight-for-songwriters/6630207/.
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three Senators introducing their version for the Senate.74 While
Senators Lamar Alexander,75 Bob Corker,76 and Orrin Hatch77 still
acknowledge the importance of the existing four considerations
used by the CRB when determining royalty rates, their proposed
legislation   also   stresses   the   need   to   “achieve   fair   market   value  
when setting songwriter publishing rates on digital music
services.”78
SEA proposes an amendment to federal copyright law
regarding the exclusive rights of sound recording copyright owners
to remove a provision under Section 114 of the Copyright Act that
prohibits license fees payable for the public performance of sound
recordings from being taken into account in any administrative,
74

See Songwriter Equity Act of 2014, S. 2321, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014); 160
Cong. Rec. S 2910 (daily ed. May 12, 2014) (introduction of senate bill 2321,
Songwriter Equity Act of 2014); Christman, supra note 73.
75
Andrew Lamar Alexander is a Republican United States Senator from
Tennessee,   having   served   since   2003.   See   About/Lamar   Alexander,   U.S.   SENATOR  
LAMAR   ALEXANDER,  http://www.alexander.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/lamaralexander  
(last  visited  Nov.  15,  2014).
76
Bob Corker is a Republican United States Senator from Tennessee,
having served since 2007. See Biography, U.S. SENATOR BOB CORKER,
www.corker.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/biography (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
77
Having served seven terms as a member of the Republican Party, Orrin
Grant Hatch is a United State Senator from Utah and the most senior Republican
Party member in the United States Senate. See Biography, U.S. SENATOR ORRIN
HATCH, http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/biography (last visited
Nov. 15, 2014). Hatch has also worked as a professional songwriter, writing
mostly worship songs, but also achieving mainstream success. See Jesse Fox
Mayshark, Orrin Hatch, Lyricist, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2006),
www.nytimes.com/2006/07/16/weekinreview/16word.html. For information on
Senator   Hatch’s   political   career,   see   U.S. SENATOR ORRIN HATCH,
www.hatch.senate.gov/public (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). To read more about
Hatch’s  career  in  songwriting  and  music  management, see Jesse Fox Mayshark,
Orrin
Hatch,
Lyricist,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
16,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/16/weekinreview/16word.html.
78
Christman, supra note 73 (“The  new  legislation  aims  to  charge  the  CRB  
with replicating the rate levels that would be achieved in a market with a willing
seller   and   a   willing   buyer.”);;   see also Songwriter Equity Act Press Kit, supra
note 71.
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judicial, or other governmental proceeding to set or adjust the
royalties payable to copyright owners of musical works for the
public performance of their works.79 In amending Section 114(i) of
the Copyright Act, a rate court would be allowed to consider all
relevant evidence presented by the parties when determining
songwriter compensation.80 This amendment would grant each
individual rate court discretion in how evidence provided in each
case should be considered in the decision-making process.81
Advocates of the SEA proposal have high hopes that when
establishing rates and terms for each agreement, CRJs will base
their decisions on economically fair marketplace quotas as well as
information presented by the participating parties.82 In theory,
mechanical rates would be based on what a willing consumer
would pay the artist for their work, and in turn, a more objective
mechanical rate would be used to establish performance rates paid
by digital streaming services.83
SEA also suggests replacement of the insufficient royalty rate
currently used by the CRB; the new rate to determine mechanical
royalties would more accurately reflect free-market conditions.84
79

See Songwriter Equity Act Press Kit, supra note 71.
“Section   114(i)   of   title   17,   United   States   Code,   is   amended   to   read as
follows:(i) Effect on Royalties for Underlying Works. It is the intent of
Congress that royalties payable to copyright owners of musical works for the
public performance of their works shall not be diminished in any respect as a
result of the rights granted   in   section   106(6).”   H.R.   4079,   113th   Cong.   §   2  
(2014), avalible at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/housebill/4079/text.
81
See Songwriter Equity Act Press Kit, supra note 71.
82
See Songwriter Equity Act Press Kit, supra note 71. “We   are   simply  
asking Congress to take the evidentiary blinders off of the judges who control a
significant   portion   of   our   writers’   income.   We   believe   that   an   open   and   full  
picture of the market will permit our rate court to recognize the value of musical
works.”  Id. (quoting  BMI  CEO  Michael  O’Neill).
83
See id.
84
See id. The standard royalty rate per song made and distributed on or after
January 1, 2006, is 9.1¢ per song or 1.75¢ per minute of playing, whichever
amount is greater. 37 C.F.R. § 255.3(m) (2014). For more information about
how compulsory license rates for sound recordings of nondramatic musical
80
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However admirable this goal may be, SEA omits any suggestions
on how the government should establish a fair market value for
royalty payments of each song.
B. Reactions to the Songwriter Equity Act
For songwriters, this pending legislation appears to be nothing
but good news.85 Even with potentially higher streaming prices for
consumers, changes would reflect a marketplace in which those
responsible for music composition would be more reasonably
compensated for their work.86 In a press kit presented by the
House,87 David Israelite, President and CEO of the National Music
Publishers Association,88 illustrated the importance of
improvement concerning the manner in which the CRB evaluates
songwriter royalties. Israelite noted that while a mechanical royalty
rate of two cents per song was set in 1909,89 the same rate has only
works have been altered over time, see 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT § 5.28 (2d ed. 2013).
According  of  advocates  of  the  bill,  “[t]his  minimal increase is due to current
law, which directs the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB)—the government body
responsible for setting the rate—to apply a standard that does not reflect market
value.”  Songwriter  Equity  Act  Press  Kit,  supra note 71.
85
Songwriter Equity Act Press Kit, supra note 71. As Paul Williams,
President  and  Chairman  of  the  Board  for  ASCAP,  has  stated,  “‘[b]y  updating  the  
outdated provisions of the Copyright Act in Sections 114(i) and 115, Congress
has an opportunity to modernize the music licensing system so that songwriters
and  composers  can  thrive  alongside  the  businesses  that  use  our  music.’”  Id.
86
While many sources are quick to jump to the conclusion that an increased
mechanical royalty rate will benefit composers, there is currently no authority on
how great an impact there could be.
87
Songwriter Equity Act Press Kit, supra note 71.
88
The National Music Publishers Association (NMPA) is a trade
association for the American music publishing industry. With over 3,000
members, the organization   aims   to   “protect   its   members’   property   right   on   the  
legislative,   litigation,   and   regulatory   fronts”.   The   NMPA   has   pursed   litigation  
against numerous organizations participating in illegal music distribution,
including YouTube, LimeWire, Kazaa, and Napster. NMPA Mission Statement,
NAT’L MUSIC PUBLISHERS ASS’N, http://www.nmpa.org/aboutnmpa/mission.asp
(last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
89
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
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increased   to   9.1   cents   in   today’s   market.90 While a seven-cent
difference may not seem staggering, he continues to illustrate a
shocking parallel in that while a dozen eggs would have cost
fourteen cents in 1909, the same amount of product would cost
roughly   three   dollars   in   today’s   grocery   stores.91 “[T]he standard
rates   of   inflation   seem   to   somehow   not   apply   to   songwriter,”  
Israelite stated.   “We  must  inject   fairness   into  an  outdated  process  
that is undeniably stacked against songwriters and publishers,
ensuring  they  are  rightly  compensated  for  their  work.”92
In addition to the National Music Publishers Association, all
three PROs have stated public support for SEA. Pat Collins,
President and CEO of SESAC, gave overwhelming support for the
bill, saying:  “[o]ur goal is to maximize the value of the copyrights
we represent on behalf of our songwriters and publishers. Passing
this important legislation will help sustain that value and safeguard
the intellectual property of our creators and copyright
proprietors.”93 BMI   CEO   Michael   O’Neill has also publicly
praised the need for legislative change to copyright law, stating,
“[t]his bill is an important step on the road to fairness for
songwriters and music publishers. The current environment, where
performance of sound recordings are valued at twelve times those
of   the   musical   compositions   that   underlie   them,   is   untenable.”94
Paul Williams, President and Chairman of the ASCAP Board,
concurs with fellow PRO executives: “The  Songwriter  Equity  Act  
is an important first step toward a more effective and efficient
90

Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate, No. 2006-3 CRB
DPRA, (2006) available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2006-3/dprapublic-final-rates-terms.pdf
91
Christman, supra note 73.
92
Neil Portnow, President and CEO of The Recording Academy, supports
Israelite’s  stance  in  saying,  “The  Songwriter  Equity  Act  will  bring  more  fairness  
to those who write and compose the music loved worldwide . . . . All music
creators deserve to be paid fair market value  for  their  talents  .  .  .  .”  Songwriter  
Equity Act Press Kit, supra note 71.
93
Id.
94
Id.
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licensing system that will benefit everyone—consumers, music
licensees and the songwriters and composers who are the
foundation  of  the  rapidly  changing  music  environment.”95
While there is adamant support of the proposed legislation, not
everyone in the industry is so hastily welcoming the   legislation’s
proposals. The National Association of Broadcasters96 (NAB) is in
public opposition of the pending legislation.97 According to NAB
Executive Vice President of Communications Dennis Wharton, the
proposed   legislation   has   the   potential   to   impose   “new   costs   on  
broadcasters that jeopardize the future of our free locally-focused
service.”98 Additionally, Wharton stated, “[w]hile this legislation
raises important issues about the changes confronting the
songwriter community, NAB objects to changes in law that would
deal with the financial imbalance between songwriters and artists
by subjecting free broadcast radio stations to new fees.”99
Despite relatively minor concerns raised by organizations
within the music industry, it is somewhat hard to detect a downside
to the SEA proposal. However, while many regular citizens would
95

Id.; see also, ASCAP Applauds the Introduction of the Songwriter Equity
Act, AM. SOC’Y COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS (Feb. 25, 2014),
http://www.ascap.com/press/2014/0225-ascap-statement-on-sea.aspx.
It  is  important  to  recognize  ASCAP’s  support  of  the  bill  is  purely  based  on  
its belief that legislative changes will benefit the artists they support. Since
ASCAP does not collect mechanical royalties, it is the one PRO that would see
no financial gain in the  bill’s  possible  passing.  Ari  Herstand,  Congress Wants to
Hear Your Songs and Stories to Help Fix the Copyright Law, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS
(Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2014/04/28/songwriterequity-act.
96
The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) is a trade association,
workers union, and lobby group that represents the interests of for-profit, overthe-air radio and television broadcasters in the United States. The NAB
represents more than 8,300 radio and television stations and broadcast networks.
NAT’L ASS’N OF BROADCASTERS, http://www.nab.org (last visited Nov. 15,
2014).
97
See, Christman, supra note 73.
98
Id.
99
Id.
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likely be in support of fair compensation for composers, there is a
substantial likelihood that prices for music streaming services
would  significantly  increase  with  legislative  changes.  “Raising  the  
price of digital streaming would be the wrong   technology   call,”  
stated a recent editorial in The Washington Times, “the  higher  rates  
would  be  passed  on  to  consumers.”100 But why does it matter that
streaming service costs could increase? Many consumers, while
not completely enthused about raised prices, would still support
fair compensation for the artists whose works they enjoy.
However, should SEA proposals succeed, there is great potential
for an abundance of artist compensation issues to accompany the
legislative changes.
V. MUSIC INDUSTRY RECTIFICATION THROUGH THE
SONGWRITER EQUITY ACT
Historically, changes in the music industry have been
incremental; however, with the evolution of digital music, a more
transformative change is necessary. Until recently, record
companies had four major costs: recording, manufacturing,
distribution, and promotion.101 While all four functions are
necessary to the industry, all but recording have been removed or
modified due to recent technological advancements in the Internet
age.102 Solutions to correct issues within the music industry
generally fall into three categories: statutory, administrative, and
free-market approaches.103 While there are strong advocates for
100

Daniel Horowitz, Editorial: Songwriter Equity Act Inequity, WASH. TIMES
(June 6, 2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jun/6/editorialsongwriter-inequity/.
101
Steve Lawson, Transformative Vs. Incremental Change, MUSIC THINK
TANK (Nov. 14, 2009), http://www.musicthinktank.com/blog/transformative-vsincremental-change.html (explaining why changes in the music industry must
occur at a quicker pace to keep up with current changes to online distribution
services).
102
Id.
103
Jared S. Welsh, Pay What You Like—No, Really: Why Copyright Law
Should Make Digital Music Free for Noncommercial Uses, 58 EMORY L.J. 1495,
1528–30 (2009).
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each type of reformation within the music industry, administrative
and free-market solutions are likely to be highly time intensive
without producing many benefits for the affected parties. Statutory
changes, such as SEA, are increasing in popularity. However, these
solutions would likely also be ineffective due to increased costs to
consumers,  which   would  only  further  society’s  tendency  to   resort  
to piracy.104 A more realistic approach to combat the compensation
issues present in the industry would be to switch over to a model
mirroring   television’s   recent switch to online streaming. For a
nominal fee, consumers might be more willing to compromise
between paying for full, physical albums outright and illegally
obtaining music. While there currently are popular online
distribution services available to consumers, these services are
inadequate due to their inability to reasonably compensate artists.
A. Statutory Reformation: The Songwriter Equity Act is Not the
Answer
While restructuring the Copyright Act is generally debated,
there is little argument to proposed section 114(i) alterations.
Section 114(i) prevents the establishment of a fair and efficient
rate-setting procedure, but “there   is   no   policy   justification   for  
retaining this provision, which favors one group of rights holders
104

See Ram D. Gopel, G. Lawrence Sanders, Sudip Bhattacharjee, Manish
Agrawal & Suzanne C. Wagner, A Behavioral Model of Digital Music Piracy,
14 J. ORGANIZATIONAL COMPUTING & ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 89 (2004)
(“Economic   incentives   to   pirate   digital   audio   include   the   high   costs   of  
purchasing legitimate copies of audio CDs . . . higher music purchasing cost
would increase the payoff from piracy, ceteris paribus. Such an increase in the
payoff would naturally increase  the  likelihood  for  piracy.”).  
Additionally, as a general note, statutory amendments do not historically
always lead to changes in social practice. For example, the Civil Rights Act of
1968 outlawed discrimination based on race. While much of today’s   society  
would agree racial discrimination is an issue of the past, it still runs rampant in
today’s   culture.   See, e.g., Deuel Ross, Pouring Old Poison Into New Bottles:
How Discretion and the Discriminatory Administration of Voter ID Laws
Recreate Literacy Tests, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 362, 364 (2014).
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over another based solely on being the first  to  achieve  their  ‘place  
at   the   table.’”105 By allowing artists and PROs to present
mechanical royalties as a standard for performance royalties, there
is a greater likelihood that the music market will more fairly
compensate artists.
Unlike the section 114(i) reformation, which has been fairly
well received, the statutory change in section 115 of the Copyright
Act is a hot-button   topic   in   Congress   and   among   today’s   music  
industry professionals. In a statement for the July 2005 Senate
hearing, the Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, argued that
the bulk of consumers would choose to use a legal downloading
service over illegal file sharing options if the service could offer an
equivalent product:
Right now, illegitimate services clearly offer
something that consumers want: lots of music at
little or no cost. They can do this because they offer
people a means to obtain any music they please
without obtaining the appropriate licenses.
However, under the complex licensing scheme
engendered by the present section 115, legal music
services must engage in numerous negotiations with
publishers and record companies, which result in
time delays and increased transaction costs. In cases
where they cannot succeed in obtaining all of the
rights they need in order to make a musical
composition available, the legal music services
simply do not offer that selection, thereby making

105

Mary LaFrance, From Whether to How: The Challenge of Implementing
a Full Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. 221, 261 (2011).
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them less attractive to the listening public than the
pirates.106
While Peters makes a valid point concerning the complexity of
the current licensing process and suggests a drastic reformation of
section 115, such a dramatic change could cause even more
confusion for those seeking out these licenses.107
Supporters of statutory changes argue that such alterations
should be made to streamline the Copyright Act.108 In Reforming
Section 115: Escape from the Byzantine World of Mechanical
Licensing, Skyla Mitchell identifies record companies as being
affected by amendments to section 115 in two major ways: cover
songs and piracy.109 Mitchell  states,  “[i]t is questionable how much
the record companies rely on cover songs for income; but to the
extent they do, it is clearly in their best interest to maintain a
compulsory   license   with   a   statutory   rate   ceiling.”110 The more
pressing issue addressed by record companies is concern over
piracy. It would be more beneficial for record companies to focus
on streamlining the licensing process, which would enable them to
provide new products and media formats capable of competing
with pirated offerings.111 The SEA is a textbook example of a
legislative push towards statutory change.
106

Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property, Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 120 (2005) (statement of
Marybeth Peters, Reg. Copyrights).
107
For  a  complete  analysis  of  Marybeth  Peters’  Senate  address  concerning  
copyright reformation and its potential impact on the music industry, see
William Henslee, Marybeth Peters is Almost Right: An Alternative to her
Proposals to Reform the Compulsory License Scheme for Music, 48 WASHBURN
L.J. 107, 118–22 (2008).
108
See Welsh, supra note 103, at 1530 (summarizing various statutory
reform methods advocated by various experts in American copyright law).
109
Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1260.
110
Id.
111
Digital Music Licensing and Section 115 of the Copyright Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15 (2005) (statement of Lawrence
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While increasing the minimum royalty rates paid to composers
could positively impact the music industry, the fact remains that
people are still illegally downloading significant amounts of music
in spite of the copyright laws that are already in place, causing
massive losses in profits to music production companies.112 In
contrast to proposals suggesting changes to the Copyright Act,
some statutory proposals suggest changes be made to criminal law,
such as making it a criminal offense to download music illegally
from peer-to-peer servers.113 Enforcing criminal penalties would
Kenswil, President of e-Labs, Universal Music Group).
According  to  Kenswil,   “[T]he  antiquated  structure  of   Section 115, with its
one-song-at-a-time, one-publisher-at-a-time licensing model, is frustrating the
introduction of [new technologies and distribution platforms] . . . [that] provide
superior audio fidelity . . . as well as improved security to reduce the sting of
piracy.”  Id. at 35, 39.
112
An analysis by the Institute for Policy Innovation stated that music
piracy causes approximately $12.5 billion in economic losses each year.
Additionally, it results in 71,060 U.S. jobs  lost,  a  loss  of  $2.7  billion  in  workers’  
earnings, a loss of $422 million in tax revenues, $291 million in lost personal
income tax, and $131 million in lost corporate income and production taxes.
Stephen E. Siwek, The True Cost of Sound Recording Piracy to the U.S.
Economy, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INNOVATION (Aug. 21, 2007),
http://www.ipi.org/ipi_issues/detail/the-true-cost-of-sound-recording-piracy-tothe-us-economy.
113
McGill suggests a warning system, which would alert habitual illegal
downloaders that their activities are being monitored. David A. McGill, New
Year, New Catch-22:  Why  the  RIAA’s  Proposed  Partnership  with  ISPs  Will  Not  
Significantly Decrease the Prevalence of P2P Music File Sharing, 29 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 353, 360 (2009). Should this warning go unnoticed or, more likely,
ignored, then Internet service to the consumer would be delayed or shut off.
McGill also believes, regardless of the measures taken to stop illegal
downloading practices, the right to file a lawsuit against the alleged infringer
should be maintained. Id. at 353, 359.
Lawsuits against parties participating in illegal file sharing are rarely
effective. However, there also appears to be no manageable way to protect
copyrighted music without giving the music industry more power, which would
likely lead to a greater restriction to the public in its personal use of music. The
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has proposed the Secure
Digital Music Initiative, which would require all electronic devices that play
music to install new protective mechanics. Such software would prevent users
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have a radical effect on society. Prosecuting for damages that are
grossly disproportionate to the crime of illegal downloading would
be unconstitutional, and public protest could make this result
exceedingly unlikely.114 While statutory approaches may appear as
the best mode of change, they can only lay the groundwork for
reformation.
Considering the ease with which recorded music is transferred
among individuals online, parties other than the artist are able to
reap benefits from the creation of this music.115 Since this creates
high transaction costs, creators want to protect themselves against
the threat of free riding by demanding a higher price for their
works.116 While statutory reformation of section 115 of the
Copyright Act is a plausible response to this issue, by increasing
mechanical royalty rates, SEA reformation would actually add to
costs of music production as well as transaction costs. Parties
pirating music are effectively avoiding such costs. And, although it
may seem counter-intuitive, digital distribution has actually
reduced the risk that parties other than the artist will significantly
benefit from distribution profits.117
from burning music CDs to or from a computer, downloading music, or
transferring music to an MP3 player. While in theory this may seem like a
successful approach, allowing the music industry control over what the public
hears, what devices they use to listen to music, and how much an individual
must pay for each use of a song is frighteningly restrictive. David Nelson, Free
the Music: Rethinking the Role of Copyright in an Age of Digital Distribution,
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 570–71 (2005).
114
Boehm, supra note 46, at 207 (proposing criminal enforcement as a
deterrence method for illegal downloading).
115
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Architectures for Music: Law Should Get Out
of the Way, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 259, 266 (2007).
116
Id. at 267.
117
For a study indicating the decrease in illegal online file sharing, see
Music File Sharing Declined Significantly in 2012, NPD GROUP (Feb. 26, 2012),
https://www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/news/press-releases/the-npd-groupmusic-file-sharing-declined-significantly-in-2012/. See generally Welsh, supra
note   103,   at   1525   (“[A]lthough   the   music   industry   claims   otherwise,   digital  
technology has actually reduced the risk of free-riding. It has done so both by
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B. The Songwriter Equity Act’s  Limitations  on Maximizing the
Availability of Diverse Creative Works to the Public
The objectives by which mechanical royalties are established
are defined in section 801 of the Copyright Act.118 While the CRB
is responsible for balancing potential benefits to the public and fair
compensation to the copyright holder, these considerations must
also be balanced against the potential impacts of the rate on the
music industry as a whole.119 While these objectives were followed
during the initial fixation of the statutory rate, many practitioners
in the music industry feel that recent rate courts have not been so
diligent.120
The CRB has long acknowledged the importance of allowing
consumers access to an abundance of musical options.121 If music
retailers and policy makers follow the intent of the Copyright Act,
the royalty rate should provide incentive to create works for the
benefit of the public.122 As with any service, the number and
reducing costs and by increasing demand for recorded music, making music that
much easier to acquire legitimately and thus decreasing the relative risk of freeriding.”).
118
17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2000).
119
David Kostiner, Will Mechanicals Break the Digital Machine?:
Determining A Fair Mechanical Royalty Rate for Permanent Digital
Phonographic Downloads, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 653, 675 (2005).
120
Abrams, supra note 39, at 235–37.
121
160 CONG. REC. S3510 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Dianne Feinstein).
122
There is no debate that the CRB is charged with the responsibility of
providing the public with as many musical offerings as possible. While it is still
uncertain how potential changes under SEA would affect music dissemination,
independent webcasters are currently combating paralleling issues with
webcasting royalties. (A webcast is any media presentation distributed over the
Internet to many simultaneous listeners or viewers.) With legislative changes
intended to promote Internet usage by webcasters, many fear the decision to
increase   royalty   rates   will   “stifle[]   technological   innovation   and   use,   thereby  
eliminating  forums  that  provide  creative  works  to  the  public.”  Sara  O’Connell,  
Counting Down Another Music Marathon: Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panels and the Case of Internet Radio, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 161, 177
(2004).
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variety of artists represented in any given market will likely dictate
its success with consumers.123 As identified by David Kostiner,
“[i]f   the   mechanical   royalty   rate   paid   to   composers   is  
disproportionate to the wholesale income realized by record labels,
those labels may decide to decrease the availability of their online
catalogs, depriving the public of an exciting, economical, and
convenient  method  of  purchasing  music.”124 If the mechanical rate
were to be altered, it would likely make diverse creative works less
available to the public.125
While SEA proposals are admirable in their desire to more
fairly compensate songwriters, a rise in current royalty rates will
almost certainly result in higher price tags for consumers,
hindering the ability to access inexpensive and diverse music.126
Major labels, which are frequently owned by parent corporations,
generally focus on maximizing profits through the release of only
the most profitable works.127 Considering that a handful of major
While the consequences policy makers are currently facing in response to
heightened royalty rates for webcasters is not completely indicative of what
could happen should the SEA bill pass, there is certainly a possibility for a
similar negative response.
123
David Kostiner, Will Mechanics Break the Digital Machine?:
Determining a Fair Mechanical Royalty Rate for Permanent Digital
Phonographic Downloads, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 235,
247–48 (2004).
124
Id. at 235.
125
Jenna Hentoff, Compulsory Licensing of Musical Works in the Digital
Age: Why the Current Process is Ineffective and How Congress is Attempting to
Fix It, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 113, 126 (2008).
126
Kostiner, supra note 123, at 245.
127
In   today’s   market,   major   labels   are   more   concerned   than   ever   with  
producing enough hits to remain financially stable. According an opinion by
Forbes   Magazine,   “big-business”   record   labels   are   in   for   a   drastic   change,   and  
scrambling to make changes to meet the evolving music market. Richard Busch,
Major Record Labels as Dinosaurs?, FORBES MAGAZINE, (Mar. 27, 2012, 1:05
PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardbusch/2012/03/27/major-record-labelsas-dinosaurs/.   “For   decades   the   industry relied on a business model of selling
massive amounts of copies of a few albums to finance the high-cost of
producing records, plugging songs to radio, and overcoming the losses from
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labels control 85% of the market—while hundreds of independent
labels have the remainder—the distribution of wealth and
resources is heavily slanted toward artists with previous
mainstream success.128 In addressing how many songwriters will
actually see a tangible benefit from the new legislations, copyright
lawyer   Raymond   Scott   noted,   “even   if   you   double   the   relatively  
small performance royalty songwriters get each time their song is
played,   that   won’t   matter   for   songwriters   who   don’t   get   much   of  
the pie ASCAP and BMI slices up; the real winner will be already
successful songwriters whose songs are widely played in
prominent  places.”129
Independent labels are continuing to rise in popularity among
artists and are therefore also growing in total record sales
nationally.130 More intimate labels are a valuable alternative to
their other projects. Record companies used the clout of having access to
recording studios and access to airplay on the radio to their advantage in
contract negotiations with artists, which leveled their risk intake of the enormous
costs   and   influence   needed   to   both   produce   and   push   a   record.”   Id. However,
with major changes, mainly technological ones, we may soon be noticing a
change   in   major   labels   to   more   closely   mirror   independent   competitors.   “The  
major labels in the ’70s–’90s became experts at mainstream marketing in the
days of a singular medium of either radio stations or, from the 1980s on, MTV.
In the music scene of today there are multiple subgenres and blogs catering to
niche audiences on the Internet, 500 cable channels, satellite radio, Internet
radio, etc. Massive corporations are not built for this type of promotions, but a
smaller  record  label,  a  small  marketing  firm  or  a  motivated  artist  are.”  Id.
128
Peter Jan Honigsberg, The Evolution and Revolution of Napster, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 477 (2002).
129
Julia Rogers, Twitter and SoundCloud, Songwriter Equity Act and
Electronic Dance Music News, MUSICIAN COACHING: STRATEGY & BUSINESS
PLANNING FOR MUSICIANS (May 25, 2014), http://musiciancoaching.com/musicnews-2014/twitter-and-soundcloud-songwriter-equity-act-electronic-dancemusic/.
130
“Becoming  an  Indie  Label  signed artist has become a movement, a trend,
some may even say a fad. But indie labels have created a true niche for
themselves and their business has been booming. So much so, in fact, that many
of the Major Labels are now beginning to embrace the Indie Label methods in
order  to  achieve  future  growth  as  a  company.  While  indie  labels  can’t  offer  the  
kind of funding for artists that the major labels can, they do offer many other
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major labels, which, due to size and marketing expenditures,
require their releases to appeal to an unrealistically large
population in order to recoup the money invested in the release.131
Since independent labels are already more extensively affected by
piracy and file sharing, they cannot afford to have their profit
margins lessened any further.132
By increasing the mechanical royalty rate even further, it is
unlikely that independent labels will be able to afford marketing
efforts to promote a variety of lesser-known artists.133 A failure to
benefits  that  may  be   more  important  to  the  artist.”  Johnathan  Ostrow,   Indie vs.
Major: Which Record Label Contract is Right for You?, MUSIC THINK TANK
(May 16, 2010), http://www.musicthinktank.com/mtt-open/indie-vs-majorwhich-record-label-contract-is-right-for-you.html.
131
Kostiner, supra note 123, at 256.
132
Most notably, the greatest downfall to artists in choosing an independent
label  is  a  general  lack  of  funding.  “A  lack  of  funding  means  a  smaller  budget  for  
recording, production of physical disks, packaging, distribution costs, tour
support, merchandise, etc. Another significant issue caused by a lack of budget
is that proper marketing for the artist is sacrificed, making the artists promote
themselves  if  they  want  to  be  seen  and  heard.”  Ostrow,  supra note 130. Not only
are artists somewhat more responsible for self-promotion, since profit margins
are less stable to begin with, it is likely that independent labels will feel the
effects of piracy and file sharing more abrasively. Id.
133
The most recent increase in mechanical royalties greatly affected Internet
radio stations of all sizes. Andrew Stockment, Internet Radio: The Case for a
Technology Neutral Royalty Standard, 95 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2154–56 (2009)
(“In  2008,  CBS  Radio  took  over  the  internet  radio  services  of  both  AOL  Radio  
and Yahoo! radio. Fred McIntyre, senior vice president of AOL Radio, said that
royalties were too high to operate the business at a profit even before the CRB
decision.”).   According   to   one   mid-size   Internet   radio   station   owner,   “[t]his  
royalty structure would wipe out an entire class of businesses: small independent
webcasters such as myself and my wife, who operate Radio Paradise. Our
obligation under this rate structure would be equal to over 125% of our total
income. There is no practical way for us to increase our income so dramatically
as  to  render  that  affordable.”  Id. at 2156 (citing Daniel McSwain, Webcast Royalty
Rate Decision Announced, RAIN: Radio and Internet Newsletter (Kurt Hanson), Mar.
2, 2007, http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/030207/index.shtml). While this
result will not definitively occur if SEA increases mechanical royalties in the music
industry, there is definitely a strong possibility of a similar effect. Andrew Stockment,
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support such artists would likely result in a diminished music
variety, only providing opportunities for those reaching a certain
threshold of popularity. Many labels, especially smaller
independent ones, may decide not to make their music available
online because lower profit margins could result from paying
composers a statutory fee; this is especially true if the mechanical
rate is set too high.134 To create the most mutually beneficial
marketplace, reformation should be focused on creating a system
that represents more artists, therefore giving consumers a wider
variety of options. In fear of hindering possibilities for less
mainstream artists, music labels should be protected from overly
burdensome royalty rates.135
VI. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO COPYRIGHT ACT
REFORMATION
A. Administrative Proposals: Collective Licensing
A substantial number of concerned parties support
modifications to copyright law through administrative proposals,
which would remedy copyright issues through a collective license
informally referred to as a blanket licensing scheme.136 Proponents
of administrative changes suggest implementing an organization

Internet Radio: The Case for a Technology Neutral Royalty Standard, 95 VA. L.
REV. 2129, 1254–56 (2009).
134
Kostiner, supra note 123, at 250.
135
According to Gregory Alan Barnes, who serves as general legal counsel
to the Digital Media Association, the potential for a heightened mechanical
royalty rate would likely stifle music distribution  across  all  platforms.  “[A]  key  
provision of the legislation seeks to raise the cost of doing business for online
music stores and on-demand streaming services at a time when both music
platforms are engaged in a fierce battle with pirate websites that provide access
to   unauthorized   content   for   free.”   Gregory   Alan   Barnes,   In Debate Over
Compensation, Songwriter Equity Act is Off- Key, CQ ROLL CALL (Apr. 14, 2014, 5 AM),
http://www.rollcall.com/news/in_debate_over_compensation_songwriter_equity_act_is_of
f_key_commentary-232077-1.html.
136
Id. at 1528; see also Mark F. Schultz, Live Performance, Copyright, and
the Future of the Music Business, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 685, 695 n.51 (2009).
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that would administer royalties for digital distribution purposes.137
Under a blanket licensing proposal, a music service, such as
iTunes, would negotiate and pay for a single license that would
give the service provider the right to distribute any musical
compositions  that  fall  under  the  “blanket”  of  the  agreement.138
Considering this administrative view is based closely off
the successful PRO model, it appears to be an appealing option in
fairly distributing license proceeds.139 Additionally, since the rate
of this type of agreement would likely be extensively negotiated
between the parties, there is a much greater probability that the
final cost of a blanket license would more fairly reflect current
market rates than the current statutory rate does.140 However, if a
collective licensing system were adopted to remedy the
problematic section 115, the administration of this new blanket
license would need to be evaluated.141 Additionally, restrictions
under the current section 115 require licensing of musical works on
a song-by-song basis, which would likely prevent companies from
licensing large numbers of works at one time.142 The logistics of
137

These methods generally track the common model used by PROs, in that
they would gather blanket license fees from users, which would then be
distributed to copyright holders according to the amount of use. See Jessica
Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 41–44
(2004).
138
It was declared in 2001 that PROs (in the initial instance, BMI) had to
make blanket licenses available. United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 275 F.3d
168, 171 (2d Cir. 2001). However, courts had to derive new formulas for the
determination of blanket fees. Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX, 726 F. Supp. 2d 355,
355–56 (2d Cir. 2012). See e.g., Carly Olson, Changing Tides in Music
Licensing? BMI v. DMX and In re THP, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP., 276,
282–284 (2012).
139
Litman, supra note 137, at 41–44.
140
Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1264; see Bigger Than Grokster?, THE 463: INSIDE
TECH POLICY, (June 23, 2005), http://463.blogs.com/the_463/2005/06/bigger_than_gro.html.
141
Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing
Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 266–
267 (2001).
142
See 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(1) (2006); see also Brian Sanchez, The Section
115 Mechanical License and the Copyright Modernization Act: The Hardships
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setting up a new, effective system of licensing would be daunting
and require a significant amount of time and resources.143 While it
may be worth the time and resources necessary to create and
maintain such a system, more efficient private contractual
solutions exist.144
B. Free-Market Proposals
Advocates of free-market proposals suggest taking no
action in copyright reconstruction and instead recommend
allowing the market to stabilize on its own.145 Proponents of this
theory believe that “as   more   consumer-friendly technologies
develop and lure new users back from illegal file sharing, an
economic   equilibrium   will   ultimately   occur.”146 However, due to
the vast changes to the music industry in the past decade, there is
no support for suggesting that inaction would solve problems
relating to lack of compensation for composers and financial
deficits due to illegal downloading. Even if a balance between
copyright law and emerging technology were struck, composers
would likely face severe losses in the meantime.147 A free-market
and statutory hybrid proposal has also recently been considered;
the proposal would modify the Copyright Act to benefit noncommercial sound recordings of music, allowing the public to
share music so long as it is done without commercial profit.148
While this possibility is obviously appealing to consumers, there is

of Legislating Music Industry Negotiations, 17 DE PAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L.
37 at 64 (2006).
143
Id.
144
As discussed later in this piece, copyright law is likely not the best
approach to a lasting change in the music industry. By forming private
contractual agreements, a more sustaining, beneficial relationship will be formed
between artists and distribution teams. See infra Part VI.C.
145
See Welsh, supra note 103, at 1529.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 1532.
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no foreseeable way for the music industry to continue on such a
financially lacking system.149
C. Digital Distribution: The Answer  Today’s  Music  Market  Has  
Been Searching For?
In an effort to cut distribution and promotional costs, many
artists have already explored online distribution methods. Record
labels may approach online distribution with a justifiable sense of
hesitancy. By not selling full albums, there is a potential for some
financial loss. However, in switching to an online distribution
process, labels are virtually guaranteed extensive savings in
packaging and shipping costs.150 Additionally, transactions should
be efficient and nearly faultless.151 Instead of having to find a
record store that carries obscure works to purchase a full record, a
buyer can download or stream individually chosen singles from
services with unprecedented variety.152 In considering this more
affordable option, artists, composers, labels, and consumers would
all benefit, likely resulting in more music legally accessed by
consumers overall.153

149

Johnathan Handel, Uneasy Lies the Head that Wears the Crown: Why
Content’s  Kingdom  is  Slipping Away, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 597, 633–36
(2009) (discussing the likelihood of potential suffering should the economic
imbalance of the music industry continue).
150
As  Kostiner  validly  explains,  “[t]hese  costs  make  the  distribution  of  less  
popular artists cost prohibitive because a significant investment is required for
even the most limited release, especially when shipping charges to the thousands
of disparate major and independent retail music outlets across the country are
considered.”  Kostiner, supra note 123, at 251.
151
Id.
152
See   Alex   Veiga,   Tough   Tactics   Give   Music   Industry   New   Sales   Hope,  
INFORMATION  
WEEK,  
(Jan.  
12,  
2004,  
10:20  
AM),  
www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=17300407.
153
While the current legitimate online streaming market has not yet come
close to reaching the profits necessary to recoup piracy losses, it is making a
difference.  According  to  a  report  by  The  New  York  Times,  “Over  the  past  year,  
however, Internet streaming services like Spotify, which offer free listening,
supported by advertising or subscriptions, have gained a growing following.
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While online distribution services of this nature exist, most
notably Spotify154 and Pandora,155 they provide little to no benefit
to artists.  Considering  society’s  drastic  conversion  to  online  media  
consumption, digital distribution is very likely the answer the
industry has been searching for. However, should this be the case,
current streaming services need to make some major alterations to
provide artists with fair compensation.
Private contractual agreements are better suited than the
suggested SEA modifications to address the increasingly low
revenues of the music industry. Such an approach would still
operate under section 115 of the Copyright Act, in that parties
could negotiate royalty license fees for an amount less than that
specified by the statutory rate.156 Additionally, depending on the
distribution service, negotiations over a sound recording under
Revenue from streaming is accelerating as growth in sales of digital downloads
from  services  like  Apple’s  iTunes  slows.”  Even  though physical album sales are
dropping   about   16%   annually   worldwide,   digital   source   revenue   is   steadily  
increasing.  Eric  Pfanner,  Music  Industry  Counts  the  Cost  of  Piracy,  N.Y.  TIMES  (Jan.  
21,  2010)  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/business/global/22music.html?_r=0.
154
Spotify is a Swedish commercial music streaming service, which
launched in the United States in July 2011. The distribution site now caters to
fifty eight different markets and hosts over forty million users, ten million of
whom pay to use the upgraded version of the site. Information: What is Spotify?
SPOTIFY, https://press.spotify.com/us/information/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
For   media   reaction   to   the   site’s   original   launch   in   the   United   States,   see  
John D. Sutter, What’s  this  Spotify  Thing All About?, CNN TECH (July 15, 2011,
7:13 AM) http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/innovation/07/14/spotify.us.why/.
155
Unlike Spotify, which lets users select music preferences on an
individual   basis,   Pandora   is   a   “free   personalized   internet   radio.”   This   means
music selections are presented to the user through an automated music
recommendation
service.
What
is
Pandora?,
PANDORA,
http://help.pandora.com/customer/portal/articles/182180-what-is-pandora (last
visited Nov. 4, 2014).
156
While advocates for statutory reform may view this negatively, it should
not be considered a step back in industry change. If music production companies
begin developing long-standing working relationships with online distributors,
even negotiating at lower rates may be worth a financial sacrifice to secure a
long-term business plan.
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section 114 of the Copyright Act may still occur. However, by
focusing on private contractual agreements, the industry is likely to
save significant time and money. Instead of debating an entirely
new structure for copyright law enforcement, the existing structure
for online royalty distributions through SoundExchange could be
maintained.157 Most importantly, a proposal of this nature would
more wholly address the problems inherent in the current copyright
model while still reconciling consumer desires for affordable
music  selections  with  the  music  industry’s  desire  to  make  money.  
Online music distributors would benefit most from adopting a
model similar to online television distributors such as Hulu158 and
Netflix.159 These   agencies   are   the   television   industry’s   answer to
157

See Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1255.
Hulu is an online subscription service that offers ad-supported, ondemand video streaming of TV shows, movies, trailers, and additional media
content created by its affiliated networks. Since its creation in 2008, three of the
four largest American television networks (ABC, Fox, and NBC) have privately
contracted with the site to provide content for viewers. Additionally, in 2009
The Walt Disney Company announced it would join the venture, purchasing a
27% stake in Hulu. While the website started out as a free service, solely funded
by advertising and commercial revenue, in 2010 HuluPlus was launched, which
began charging users a nominal monthly fee for streaming access. While this
new expense may have alienated some customers, HuluPlus gained more than
1.5 million paying customers within its first year of operation by expanding the
content library for consumers. Mike Hopkins, Hulu CEO, reported the company
would reach $1 billion in revenue in 2013, and that the online service reached 5
million subscribers over the course of the year. Additionally, in 2013, Hulu
reported   expanding   its   “roster   of   advertisers”   to   more   than   1,000   different  
brands. Mike Hopkins, A Strong 2013, HULU BLOG (Aug. 24, 2014),
www.blog.hulu.com/2013/12/18/a-strong-2013/ (discussing the companies
successes over the time of operation as presented by CEO Mike Hopkins). For
general information about how Hulu Services operate, see How Hulu Works,
HOW STUFF WORKS, www.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/hulu.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 2014).
159
Netflix, Inc. is an American provider of on-demand Internet streaming
media available to viewers in North and South America, the Caribbean, and
parts of Europe. The company originally started out in 1997 as a flat rate DVDby-mail system in the United States. A mere two years later the company started
its subscription-based digital distribution service. By June 2014, Netflix had a
158
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visual digitalization, in that these agencies provide content for
streaming at a minimal price and make up any lost revenue through
advertising profits. In mirroring online television models, online
intermediaries would earn profits through online advertising,
which could in turn be used to pay record companies a negotiated
royalty fee, a percentage of their profits, or a greater of the two
amounts. Considering consumers are willing to pay for services
such as Hulu and Netflix,160 it is reasonable to believe a similar
model could be replicated in the music industry. A digital
distribution process could provide consumers with music that is
more   portable   and   less   costly,   both   appealing   aspects   to   today’s  
market.161 Additionally, studies suggest that those who illegally
download music are also those who purchase the most music.162
Therefore, there is a great potential for music distributors to save
money while increasing their stream of revenue should the
distributor choose to convert their market to a digital realm. By
partnering with multiple online intermediaries who could offer
reported 50 million subscribers internationally. Unlike Hulu, Netflix negotiates
with television companies on a show-by-show basis instead of presenting an
entire   network’s   lineup.   Netflix   has   partnered   with   Paramount   Pictures,   Lions  
Gate Entertainment, and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, increasing   the   company’s  
access to a wider selection of feature films. How Netflix Works, HOW STUFF
WORKS , www.howstuffworks.com/netflix.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
160
A 2014 report by The Huffington Post suggests that nearly a fifth of
American   Netflix   or   Hulu   subscribers   have   “cut   the   cord”   on   traditional   cable  
TV services. While that percentage is substantial, the same report states that
statistic rises to 1 in 4 consumers without traditional cable services when
considering young adults between the ages of 18 and 34. In the past 14 years,
average cable bills, not including fees, promotions, or taxes have risen a
staggering 97 percent. Therefore, consumers, especially financially strained
younger adults, are in constant pursuit of more affordable options. Timothy
Stenovec, Yes, Netflix and Hulu are Starting to Kill Cable, HUFFINGTON POST:
TECH (Apr. 17, 2014, 3:44 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/17/netflixcable_n_5168725.html.
161
See Perritt, supra note 115, at 311.
162
See, e.g., Ken Fisher, Study: P2P Users Buy More Music; Apathy, Not
Piracy, the Problem, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 20, 2006, 1:33 PM)
www.arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2006/03/6418-2 (finding in a Canadian
study that peer-to-peer downloaders bought more music).

[6:193 2015]

How Spotify Killed the Radio Star

235

advertising-supported, low-cost streaming and downloading,
record companies could potentially increase profits while likely
skirting further piracy issues.
It is evident that digital distribution methods are far more costeffective than that of traditional physical retail.163 Not only would
transactional costs to consumers decrease, but so would costs
incurred by creators.164 Internet-based promotion and distribution
are more cost-effective than traditional methods.165 With the use of
current technology, overall advertising and reproduction costs
could drastically decrease.166 A significant advantage
accompanying the adoption of this model would be the ease with
which the industry could benefit from such online music networks
to cut down on promotion costs by relying on consumers to
promote artists using grassroots methods.167 In creating a more
interactive online network of musical selections, the industry
would have further opportunities to gather consumer information.
In turn, there would likely be a vast improvement in the decisions
of distributors as to what singles or artists should be further
promoted.
The current music distribution market is frequently
characterized as a conglomerate.168 It is increasingly more
163

See Perritt, supra note 115, at 298–300.
See id. at 270.
165
See id. at 298–99.
166
See id. at 302.
167
For example, both Netflix and Hulu services allow customers to leave
comments about each television episode viewed, creating an open dialogue
amongst all viewers. Both sites also allow for customer connection to other
social media sites, increasing the likelihood customers will comment on their
viewing experiences on a variety of online platforms.
168
See, Jeffrey Gilbert, The Dixie Chicks: A Case Study for the Politics of
Hollywood, 9 TEX. REV. ENG. & SPORTS L. 307, 312 (2008). See generally,
Adam J. van Alstyne, Clear  Control:  An  Antitrust  Analysis  of  Clear  Channel’s  
Radio and Concert Empire, 88 MINN. L. REV. 627, 627-29 (2004) (explaining
how consolidation within the music promotion industry can lead to irreparable
harm to other related industries).
164

[6:193 2015]

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW REVIEW

236

common for national media companies to purchase local stations,
effectively placing all management and programming decisions
under one uniform production system.169 Conglomeration has
especially impacted the diversity of programming on local radio
stations,170 resulting   in   concentrated   “playlists”   made   at   the  
national level, which leads to a common tendency for stations
across the country to play the same songs.171 However, shifting the
music market to digital distribution could help further the
industry’s   refocus   on   the   singles   sale   market172 instead of
169

This behavior dates back to the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which
loosened restrictions on ownership of multiple stations. Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
170
The trend of music conglomeration amongst radio stations is greatly
important to the digital market considering radio plays are still where the
majority of consumers are first being introduced to music and artists. If an artist
can get on the radio, there is a much greater chance for success. See Music
Discovery Still Dominated by Radio, Says Nielson Music 360 Report, NIELSON,
(Aug.
14,
2012)
http://www.nielsen.com/content/corporate/us/en/pressroom/2012/music-discovery-still-dominated-by-radio--says-nielsen-music360.html.
171
Laura M. Holson explores the relationship between artist research and
the   narrowing  of  radio  programming   in  stating,   “as  the   world  of  radio  hardens  
into an industry dominated by three or four major chains, the use of research is
accelerating and has become far more sophisticated, leading to mounting
criticism that the quest for ratings is homogenizing music radio and making it
harder   for   a   different   sound   to   break   through.”   Holson   also   reports   that   a  
division of Clear Channel, the largest chain of radio stations, reportedly charges
record labels up to $20,000 per song to test unreleased music on audiences. She
suggests that what was once a simple conversation amongst industry
professionals determining what audiences might want to hear is now big
business. While it is important for music distributors to cater to their audiences,
today’s  music  industry  may  be  taking  matters  a  step  too  far.  Laura  M.  Holson,  
With   By-the-Numbers   Radio,   Requests   Are   a   Dying   Breed,   N.Y.   TIMES   (July   11,  
2002)   http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/11/business/with-by-the-numbers-radiorequests-are-a-dying-breed.html.
172
Services like iTunes and Amazon Prime are already allowing consumers
to purchase single songs from many full albums, but by making the trend more
widespread there is a greater chance for revenue since consumers appear
somewhat hesitant to spend much on music purchases. Boehm, supra note 46, at
196.
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traditional album distribution. It could also serve the CRB’s   goal  
of maximizing the availability of song usage. 173 If consumers are
able to access wide selections of music for a standard, low monthly
payment, the consumer may be more inclined to seek out new
artists.174 There is a great potential for artists to see abundant
financial gains stemming from album sales where consumers were
first exposed to their work on digital media platforms.175 It stands
to reason that the music industry could begin to focus more heavily
173

As   explained   by   one   industry   expert,   “For   the   most   part,   each   time   a  
song is played on ad-supported Pandora or subscription-based Spotify, it reaches
one person. Each time a song is played on the radio, it can reach thousands of
people—but when you turn on a radio station, you don't know what you're going
to hear. Musicians expand their audience when new listeners stumble upon their
work, which is why getting airplay is so important to them. Neither Pandora nor
Spotify currently has anywhere near as many listeners as AM and FM radio—
another reason it makes sense for them to pay less—but they also don't present
the  same  kind  of  opportunities  for  discovering  new  music.”  So  while  distributing  
music online might be financially less profitable, new artists will still benefit
from exposure that is uniquely accessible to online consumers. Wolk, supra note
68.
174
Sites such as Spotify and Pandora are offering this distribution
alternative already. However, as will be addressed later in this text, the rates at
which both applications are currently running are ineffective in providing profits
for the creators of the distributed music. See infra Part VI.C.i.a.
175
A   parallel   for   potential   success   can   be   drawn   in   looking   at   Netflix’s  
critically acclaimed television series House of Cards. While Netflix will not
announce the number of viewers tuning in for the program, one CNBC source
estimated  “some  16  percent  of  Netflix  users  on  one  particular  Internet  service  .  .  
.  watched  at  least  one  episode  of  the  show.”  Jenny  Cosgrave,  Viewers  ‘Binge’  on  
‘House of  Cards’  After  Netflix  Record  High, CNBC (Feb. 17, 2014, 7:19 AM),
www.cnbc.com/id/101421361#. Regardless of the number of viewers, Netflix is
seeing   notable   increases   in   share   prices   in   response   to   the   program’s   success.  
See id. But  how  does  Netflix’s  success with original programming translate into
future sales? While the program is continually available on Netflix, the company
is now also producing the series on DVD and Blu-Ray format. A similar system
could easily be implemented in the music industry. By allowing consumers to
sample many artists and albums for a low monthly price, but still retaining the
option to sell fans of each given album a hard or digital copy to add to their
collections, production companies could profit from more avenues while still
conforming to consumer demand.
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on finding and promoting artists. National Public Radio publicly
advocates for online music distribution sites to serve as a platform
for music discovery,176 where consumers can locate artists they
enjoy and then choose the best method of supporting those
artists.177 Since there could be increased attention directed toward
singles as an assessment for artist success over digital distribution
channels, it is likely that producers would save on production costs
of unsuccessful works.178

176
“Spotify   (and/or   its   many   cousins)   works   well   as   [a]   try-it-before-youbuy-it  discovery  engine.  You  can’t  discover  a  new  favorite  band  if  you’ve  never  
heard its music, so take advantage of the many different ways to stumble upon
great   stuff   and   then   make   purchases   as   an   informed   consumer.”   Stephen  
Thompson,  The  Good  Listener:  Does  Using  Spotify  Make  You  a  Bad  Person?,  NPR  
(Sept.  26,  2013,  3  PM),  http://www.npr.org/blogs/allsongs/2013/09/26/226468333/thegood-listener-does-using-spotify-make-you-a-bad-person.
177
See id. “[D]ig  into  the  tremendous  array  of  ways  to  sustain  the  livelihood  
of musicians whose work sustains you. Contribute to their Kickstarter
campaigns if they exist. Go to their concerts and encourage your friends to join
you – and,   while   you’re   there,   buy   a   T-shirt or music directly from the band
itself. Champion the music you love on social media; that word of mouth means
a  lot,  both  financially  and  for  morale.”  Id.
178
As explained by George Howard, a former mid-size record label
president who currently works as an entertainment firm advisor and associate
professor  of  music  business  and  management  at  Berklee  College  of  Music,  “it’s  
now easier than ever to create and release music, artists are freed from the onealbum-every-eighteen-months cycle that raised the stakes (and the cost of
failure)   to   such   a   scary   degree.”   George   Howard,   Sign and Fail: How the
Traditional Music Industry Killed Culture, TUNECORE (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://www.tunecore.com/blog/2011/12/sign-and-fail.html. Howard finds the
gradual  switch  from  old  music  business  where  “you  essentially  got  one  shot”  to  
a more flexible system encouraging to the promotion of a wider variety of
artists. Id. He   further   states,   “I   strongly   believe   that   this   not   only   results   in   a  
higher chance of success for artists, but also in a more diverse musical
landscape. This is because no one, no one knows what the market wants, and for
too long people thought they did. This resulted in a lot of music being put into
the   market  just  because   it  resembled  something  else  that  had  been  successful.”  
Id.
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i. Fixing the Current Online Music Distribution Model
As earlier mentioned, there are financially successful online
distribution services available to music consumers.179 It is easy to
identify these services as a viable alternative to statutory
reformation. However, under current models of online music
distribution, artists are not compensated fairly enough to promote
continuation of their work.180 And while it may appear that online
music distribution services are taking financial advantage of the
artists they supposedly support, this is not necessarily the case.
Online music distribution, as it operates today, is just not profitable
enough to sustain adequate artist payment.181 The online music
industry needs to find a way for current distribution services to
incentivize artists to continue creating musical works through
increased revenue.182
179

For purposes of this article, focus will solely rest on majority
distributors. Majority distribution services do little pre-selection for the artists
they work with in exchange for the best prices on the music market. See Budi
Voogt, The   Indie   Musician’s   Guide   to   Digital   Distribution, HYPEBOT.COM
(Nov.
26,
2013),
http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2013/11/the-indiemusicians-guide-to-digital-distribution.html. Conversely, selective distributors
pre-select their clients in an attempt to work only in promotion of a certain type
of artist. See id. iTunes and Spotify are both majority music distributors. While
Pandora is technically labeled as an online radio service, the site still grapples
with the same compensation issues as other music distribution services.
180
See David Lowery, My Song Got Played on Pandora 1 Million Times
and All I Got Was $16.89, Less Than What I Make from a Single T-Shirt Sale!,
TRICHORDIST (June 24, 2013), http://thetrichordist.com/2013/06/24/my-songgot-played-on-pandora-1-million-times-and-all-i-got-was-16-89-less-than-whati-make-from-a-single-t-shirt-sale/.
181
See   Paul   Resnikoff,   Streaming   Services   Will   Never   Become   Profitable,  
Study  
Finds...,  
DIGITAL  
MUSIC  
NEWS  
(Feb.  
18,  
2014),  
http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2014/02/18/profitless  
(“‘The  
streaming  business  has  to  slowly  move  from  a  free  economy  to  a  paid  economy  as  
the  sustainability  of  an  ad-supported  revenue  model  is  a  big  question  mark.’”).
182
“‘The  number  one  concern  of  the  individual  songwriters  and  composers  
we   represent   is   getting   fair   payment   from   digital   services,’   Paul   Williams,  
president of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers told
Wired.   ‘Whenever   I   meet   with   members   from   all   genres   of   music   who   are  
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a.  Challenges  Facing  Today’s  Online  Music  Distribution  
Model
There is no arguing that online music distribution services are
rapidly becoming integrated into our everyday lives. 183 With
exponentially growing popularity, it would appear these sites are
actually indicating a rise in artist compensation. However, while
these services are legal, many consumers are unaware of how
artists are negatively impacted by the staggeringly low royalty
payments made to those artists whose works are accessible on such
sites.184 “It’s  a  big  conundrum,”  stated  Brian   Zisk,   the  founder  of  

struggling  to  make  ends  meet,  that’s  the  thing  they  ask  about  most.  They  know  
that  streaming  is  growing,  and  they  don’t  want  to  be  left  out  in  the  cold  in  terms  
of having   their   creative   work   valued   fairly.’”   Graeme   McMillan,   Is Pandora
Really Short-Changing Songwriters?, WIRED (July 3, 2013, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2013/07/david-lowery-pandora/.
183
“In   2014,   Pandora   reached   200   million   users,   with   nearly   70   million
active each month. By comparison, Spotify has about 40 million users as of
2014,   10   million   of   them   premium   subscribers.”   Spotify vs. Pandora, DIFFEN,
http://www.diffen.com/difference/Pandora_vs_Spotify (last visited Nov. 15,
2014).
184
Countless artists have published their royalty payment records from
online distribution sites in an effort to illustrate to consumers the harm of using
services like Pandora and Spotify. One such artist is Damon Krukowski, of
Galaxie 500 and Damon &Naomi, who issued the following statement:
“Consider  Pandora  and  Spotify,  the  streaming  music  services  that  are  becoming  
ever more integrated into our daily listening habits. My BMI royalty check
arrived recently, reporting songwriting earnings from the first quarter of 2012,
and I was glad to see that our music is being listened to via these services.
Galaxie  500's  ‘Tugboat’,  for  example,  was  played  7,800  times  on  Pandora  that  
quarter, for which its three songwriters were paid a collective total of 21 cents,
or seven cents each. Spotify   pays   better:   For   the   5,960   times   ‘Tugboat’   was  
played there, Galaxie 500's songwriters went collectively into triple digits: $1.05
(35 cents each). To put this into perspective: Since we own our own recordings,
by  my  calculation  it  would  take  songwriting  royalties  for  roughly  312,000  plays  on  
Pandora  to  earn  us  the  profit  of  one--  one--  LP  sale.”  Damon  Krukowski,   Making  
Cents,   PITCHFORK   (Nov.   14,   2012),   http://pitchfork.com/features/articles/8993-thecloud/.
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SF MusicTech Summit.185 “[W]e  are  never  going  back  to  the  days  
when people can sell tens or millions of CDs. So then the question
is:  How  does  the  compensation  happen.”186
While copyright law has remained unchanged in addressing
artist compensation issues, many industry experts and performers
have publicly spoken out against the online distribution model. In
June 2013, David Lowery, guitarist for the rock band Cracker,
published his earnings from online distribution services, creating a
significant buzz throughout the music community.187 In his public
statement, My Song Got Played on Pandora 1 Million Times and
All I Got Was $16.89, Less Than What I Make From a Single TShirt Sale!, Lowery urged fellow artists to announce their earnings
from online distribution sites as well.188
After  Lowery’s  initial  attack  on  the  online  distribution  system,  
Sasha Frere- Jones, a staff writer and pop-music critic for The New
Yorker, was one of the first to address the issue:
185
“The  SF  MusicTech Summit brings together visionaries in the evolving
music/business/technology ecosystem, along with the best and brightest
developers, entrepreneurs, investors, service providers, journalists, musicians,
and organizations who work with them at the convergence of culture and
commerce.   We   meet   to   do   business   and   discuss,   in   a   proactive,   conducive   to  
dealmaking   environment.”   SF   MUSICTECH   SUMMIT,   http://www.sfmusictech.com  
(last  visited  Nov.  9,  2014).
186
Andrew  Leonard,  The  Music  Industry  is  Still  Screwed:  Why  Spotify,  Amazon  
and   iTunes   Can’t   Save   Musical   Artists,   SALON   (June   20,   2014,   6:44   AM),  
http://www.salon.com/2014/06/20/the_music_industry_is_still_screwed_why_spotif
y_amazon_and_itunes_cant_save_musical_artists/.
187
See Wolk, supra note 68. See generally Lowery, supra note 180
(Lowery’s  published  earnings).
188
See Lowery, supra note   180.   In   response   to   Lowery’s commentary on
poor online distribution profits, English singer-songwriter Sam Duckworth
published proof that one month of 4,685 plays on Spotify earned him less than
20 pounds. See Wolk, supra note 68. While the artist feels cheated by such low
profit margins, author Douglas Wolk does put this statistic in some interesting
perspective.   “That   might   well   be   the   case.   If   we're   getting   into   hypotheticals,  
though, how many of those listeners might have bought the album, or come to
one of Duckworth's shows, because they heard the stream and were impressed
by  what  they  heard?”  Id.
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The shortest version is that the Spotify model does not favor
new artists. The larger grumbling about streaming services in the
musician community is that the various services, which are
governed by fluid and complex laws that are changing as we speak,
favor nobody but the major labels that helped fund and grow some
of them.189
While Spotify routinely declines comment on its royalty rates,
according to a pool of music executives who have negotiated with
the company, Spotify pays roughly 0.5 to 0.7 cents per stream for
its paid tier, and as much as 90 percent less for free account
holders.190
For artists whose income is reliant on royalties, the biggest
concern is whether streaming will put an end to CD and download
sales by offering a cheap or free alternative. However, it is best to
keep in mind that streaming services are a relatively new offering.
As aptly stated by Donald Passman, a well-recognized music
attorney,   “Artists   didn’t   make   big   money   from   CDs   when   they  
were introduced, either. They were a specialty thing, and had a
lower royalty rate. Then as it became mainstream, the royalties
went   up.   And   that’s   what   will   happen   here.”191 While it is
uncertain this hunch will prove true, it is clear the online
distribution model is not completely flawed. The music industry
needs to search for modifications to the already functional system
that will more fairly compensate artists.192

189

Sasha Frere-Jones, If You Care About Music, Should You Ditch Spotify?,
NEW YORKER (July 19, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/sasha-frerejones/if-you-care-about-music-should-you-ditch-spotify.
190
Ben  Sisario,  As  Music  Streaming  Grows,  Royalties  Slow  to  a  Trickle,  N.Y.  TIMES,  
Jan.  28,  2013,  available  at  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/media/streamingshakes-up-music-industrys-model-for-royalties.html?pagewanted=all.  
191
Id.
192
According to one source encouraging change in the online distribution
industry,   “The key to a future where streaming may be the preferred delivery
method is dependent upon more variations and flexibility in the business model
than currently offered by Spotify. There are a range of opportunities in exploring
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b. Solutions for a More Collectively Beneficial Digital
Distribution Service
While it is clear that current online music distribution
services are not adequately serving artists, the business model is
not a lost cause. It may take some time for developers to create an
environment that is beneficial to all parties involved; however,
there are steps that can be taken to initiate change.
The first alteration in working toward fair artist compensation
would be raising service subscription fees. Both Pandora and
Spotify currently offer a free tier of subscription.193 While this is
ideal for consumers, there is no benefit to anyone involved in
creating the music they are accessing. Television distribution sites
have recognized significant success with free limited trials, but
after a temporary period, rates are always raised to a more fiscally
sustainable level.194

business models that allow for streaming rentals, and limited access to different
material  at  different  times.”  Why Spotify is Not Netflix (But Maybe it Should Be),
TRICHORDIST (Oct. 17, 2013), http://thetrichordist.com/2013/10/17/why-spotifyis-not-netflix-and-why-it-maybe-should-be/.
193
While both Spotify and Pandora are labeled as commercial services, each
program   does   allow   users   to   access   content   for   free.   Where   Pandora’s  
$4.99/month premium service allows customers to access music ad-free (as does
Spotify Premium at $9.99/month) both payment structures are optional.
Customers streaming for free will have to withstand some restrictions, as well as
advertisements.  However,  for  many  modern  consumers  this  is  a  small  price  to  pay  for  
free  
music  
services.  
Spotify  
v.  
Pandora,  
DIFFEN  
http://www.diffen.com/difference/Pandora_vs_Spotify  (last  visited  Nov.  13,  2014).
194
Both Netflix and Hulu Plus (the two most commonly accessed online
television streaming services) offer free trials for new users. However, the
longest any given trial lasts is thirty days, after which subscribers are forced to
cancel access to programming or begin monthly payments. Netflix vs. Hulu
Plus:   What’s   the   Best   App   to   Stream   TV   Shows   and   Movies?, HEAVY (July 2,
2014, 1:34 PM), http://heavy.com/tech/2014/07/netflix-vs-hulu-plus-whats-thebest-app-to-stream-tv-shows-and-movies/.

[6:193 2015]

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW REVIEW

244

The online distribution services would also be wise to explore
possibilities of transactional streaming.195 Much like how the
iTunes business model operates, there is no reason why every song
ever released should be available at the same price point. 196 While
we are already beginning to see this trend in other areas of popular
music culture, it would be beneficial for artists to charge an
advance for high-profile new releases that will attract listeners to a
specific online distribution service.197
An alternative pricing proposal to fix current issues in online
music distribution would be the implementation of a variety of
pricing tiers. Much like cable television and SiriusXM radio,198
catalogs of music could be organized and marketed towards certain

195

David Lowery, How   to   Fix   Streaming   Music’s   Business   Model,
HYPEBOT (Oct. 14, 2014) http://hypebot.com/hypebot/2014/10/how-to-fixstreaming-musics-business-model.html (noting that iTunes, a transactional
music seller, has been highly successful and that a similar model may be worth
pursuing with streaming).
196
There are endless possibilities in staggering online music pricing. For
example, new releases could be priced as transactional streams where the
consumer can choose between low-cost limited access to a new release, or pay
more for a transactional download. Id.
197
For example, country-turned-pop-artist Taylor Swift has released deluxe
editions of her past three albums exclusively to Target. While fans can still
access the bulk of her music online or from other retailers, the incentive remains
to purchase a physical CD from Target stores. Carolyn Menyes, Taylor Swift
New  Album  ‘1989’  Deluxe  Edition  to  Sell  Exclusively   at Target, MUSIC TIMES
(Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.musictimes.com/articles/8984/20140819/taylorswift-new-album-1989-deluxe-edition-target.htm; see also The Secret Genius of
Taylor Swift, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 9, 2012, 3:17 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2012/11/09/164742426/the-secret-genius-oftaylor-swift   (“[T]he   tools   Swift   didn't   use   are   as   important   than   [sic]   the   ones  
she did. By refusing to release her singles on Spotify, or any other streaming
site, she pushed her fans to buy the album. Spotify pays the artist pennies on the
dollar.  Taylor  Swift  skipped  it.”).  
198
SiriusXM Radio is commercial-free radio programming, available to
consumers at varying subscription and price levels. What is SiriusXM?,
SIRIUSXM SATELLITE RADIO, http://www.siriusxm.com/whatissiriusxm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2014).
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audiences.199 Similarly, the online music industry would likely see
positive change in a decision to implement a release windowing
system.200 Much like the structure the film industry utilizes for its
releases, music distribution services could weigh the cost of
ownership rights of new albums in relation to the length the
albums have been available for purchase on the market.
While forming a model similar to online television distribution
may seem appealing,201 consideration must be given to the
199

“Creating   bundled   packages   adds   value   to   both   the   end   user   and   the  
streaming service. Individual packages can be as little as $4.99 a month, and
complete  access  could  [be]  priced  at  $49.99  a  month.”  Lowery, supra note 195.
200
Feature-length  films  are  routinely  released  in  “windows.”  Why Spotify is
Not Netflix (But Maybe it Should Be), supra note 192. Most films follow a
format similar to this:
1. Film Released in Theaters
2. Film Released later on Video on Demand (Rental)
3. Film Released later on Cable and/or Broadcast
[4.] Film Released Later on Home Video (Rental and Purchase)
[5.] Film Released Later on Netflix (Subscription).
Id..And while this model is not always followed, the general idea is that
different levels of ownership of the movie are available at specific points in time
and for a range of prices. This model also has potential for success in the music
industry. The Trichordist suggests an online music distribution windowing
system as follows:
1. Single Release Digital Transactional Download 99 cents
2. Single/Song Release Digital Transactional Streaming Rental 10 cents for
24 hours
3. Album Release Digital Transactional Download 9.99
4. Album Release Digital Transactional Streaming Rental $1 for 24 hours
5. Select Songs Released to Subscription Streaming Services, not whole
albums.
6. Album Release Subscription Streaming Services.
Id.
201
Despite charges to consumers wishing to use services like Hulu and
Netflix, online television distribution websites appear to be continuing to make
financial gains. According to a report by Equities.com, an online financial
resource platform that combines interactive social networking capabilities for
investors   and   public   companies,   despite   Netflix’s   recent   one   dollar per month
increase in subscription price, the company is still benefitting from production
of original programming content, and subscriber rates are on the rise. Remy
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likelihood that consumers will conform to a new system. From a
distance it seems unlikely that consumers would pay even a
reasonable fee for music access when, competing, albeit illegal,
networks are still offering music for free.202 Overcoming the piracy
obstacle appears especially daunting, considering that illegal
downloading has become an international habit among the majority
of consumers.203 For an effective change in the music industry to
occur, record companies will need to incentivize behavioral
changes among consumers. In moving forward to better the online
distribution market, audience education will be undoubtedly
necessary.204 If consumers realized services such as Pandora and
Spotify are not beneficial to the artists they support, they would be
less likely to use these services.

Merritt, How Netflix is Cashing in on Orange is the New Black, EQUITIES.COM
(June
5,
2014,
10:03
PM)
http://www.equities.com/editorsdesk/stocks/technology/orange-is-the-new-black-buys-netflix-subscribersrespect.
202
While the RIAA recognizes that piracy will likely forever be an ongoing
struggle in the music industry, should artists continue to see such drastically
diminished  profits,  the  RIAA  asserts  it  would  not  be  able  to  maintain  itself.  “Q:  
Don’t   you   think   some   people are always going to download music illegally,
even with a graduated response program in place? . . . [A:] As an industry, we
have lived with street piracy for years. Similarly, there will always be a degree
of piracy on the Internet. It's not realistic to wipe it out entirely but instead to
bring it to a level of manageable control so a legitimate marketplace can really
flourish.”   For Students Doing Reports, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS’N AM.,
http://www.riaa.com/faq.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
203
While music piracy is a substantial—and unfortunately growing—issue
in the United States, international markets are seeing an even larger financial hit
due to the illegal file sharing. According to a report by The New York Times,
many critics believe music companies   “have   been   too   slow   to   embrace   new  
online business models that are attractive enough to lure music fans away from
pirate  sites.”  Pfanner,  supra note 153.
204
“Because  of  the  social  norm  of  accepting  digital  music  file-sharing, the
recording industry has attempted to change the norm by educating the public on
copyright law, which included the legal strategy of suing individual file- sharers
and labeling the act of digital file-sharing  as  theft  and  piracy.”  Schwender,  supra
note 3, at 261.
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By placing new songs in online music networks where
consumers can safely access high-quality music while still
supporting both artists and the industry, a change most likely to
benefit songwriters may occur.205 It will also be crucially
important, in following successful television models, for online
music distributors to invest resources to improve the music
community at large.206 In return, online distribution services would
hopefully begin to recognize the value of providing financial and
business support for emerging artists.207 It will undoubtedly be a
long journey for the music industry to develop a social norm
favoring legitimate avenues of music consumption; however, this
is a change necessary to its survival.208
VII. CONCLUSION
205

Spotify is the first music streaming system to see much use from
consumers. While the program (which launched in Sweden) is fairly new to the
American market, it is gaining in popularity amongst its paying users.
According  to  Spotify’s  co-founder and chief executive, Daniel Ek, the company
has high hopes that customers will begin to see the benefit of supporting artists
as valid incentive to pay the $10-per-month subscription fee. See The Spotify
Team, $2 Billion and Counting, SPOTIFY (Nov. 11, 2014),
https://news.spotify.com/uk/2014/11/11/2-billion-and-counting/   (“We’re   trying  
to build a new music economy that works for artists in a way the music industry
never  has  before.”).
206
“Netflix   in   responding   to   their   needs   in   the   marketplace   is   actually  
investing capital directly   into   content   creation   in   a   meaningful   way.”   Why
Spotify is Not Netflix (But Maybe it Should Be), supra note 192.
207
Id.
208
The music industry is not alone on the receiving end of financial hits due
to piracy. Similar anti-theft precautions are currently being employed by the film
industry as well. For example, in the spring of 2014, Warner Bros. Pictures U.K.
launched an exclusive trailer for The LEGO Movie as part of an anti-piracy
campaign targeting its young audiences. According to Liz Bales, the director
general  at  Industry  Trust  for  IP  Awareness,  it  is  “crucial  that  the  film  industry  is  
connecting them with legal services, making it easy to choose to pay for official
content and less likely that they would inadvertently or intentionally access
pirate   websites.”   Stuart  Kemp,   U.K. Anti-Piracy  Campaign  Brings  ‘The  LEGO  
Movie’   Trailer   to   Life, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Nov. 29, 2013, 8:33 AM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/uk-anti-piracy-campaign-brings660726.
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While SEA is a valid attempt at reforming the long-standing
difficulties presented in section 114 and section 115 of the
Copyright Act, it is unlikely a statutory change will most
effectively create change at the speed it needs to occur. An
increase in mechanical royalties may appear beneficial to
songwriters, but the increased production costs will likely burden
music dissemination to a crippling degree. By instead modernizing
how consumers view the accessibility of music and placing it in a
context comfortable to most purchasers, there is a possibility for
songwriters to more quickly benefit from the copyright laws
already in place. Modifications can, and should, be made to online
music distribution outlets to more ethically and financially support
every party involved in each music transaction.

